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Abstract 
Research on expert chess players, radiologists and landmine detection personnel suggests 
a use of cognitive frameworks, alternatively referred to as schemas, templates, scripts, frames 
and models, to effectively perceive, interpret, understand, recall, and anticipate information. 
These experts may use cognitive frameworks to capture past experience in ways that support 
rapid pattern recognition, adaptive responses and proactivity.  The proposed research approach 
assumes that experienced pilots will similarly rely on cognitive frameworks to handle 
information and make sense of complex, fast-moving situations experienced in their information-
dense environments.  Predictions from Klein et al.’s (2006) Data/Frame Model of Sensemaking 
were used to evaluate event-based interview data collected from uninhabited aerial system 
(UAS) pilots and high performance military aircraft pilots (F-16 and UH-60 Black Hawk) in 
order to assess the methods with which these experts handle large amounts of critical information 
in their operations.  This effort may benefit the sensemaking model, a model based largely on 
domains in which situations unfold over time and decision-making can be adapted, such as in 
information operations, nursing and fire fighting, by comparing its predictions with data 
collected from UAS pilots.  The UAS operations domain, in particular, has characteristics that 
differ from those of domains on which the model is based because UAS pilot sensemaking must 
support decisions and continuous adjustments of an aircraft operating in a dynamic, potentially 
complex, and rapidly shifting environment from which the pilot is physically removed.  The 
military aviation domain may be similar to studied domains that some decisions need to be made 
rapidly, and situations can change rapidly; nevertheless, as a new domain to the model, offers the 
potential to reveal new insights.  Based on this research, recommendations are offered for 
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aviation training and other information-rich domains, and evidence is provided that addresses the 
question, “How much information can a person handle?” 
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Introduction 
“…You just – you pull all of this data together, this amazing amount of data to deal with 
the situation” (anonymous pilot, personal communication, 2010).  Many professional domains 
require people to manage large amounts of incoming data in order to successfully complete their 
tasks.  Some tasks may be harder than others, but with experience, we are somehow able to 
manage this large amount of information in order to comprehend our current situation.  The 
purpose of this research is to study and understand the strategies and techniques successfully 
used to manage and make sense of large amounts of information under time pressure.  Knowing 
how experienced professionals make sense of large amounts of information under time 
constraints can offer insight into how individuals can be more effectively trained.  This research 
additionally contributes to a greater understanding of the limitations on - or extent of - just how 
much information people can handle in fast-paced, information-dense work environments. 
The experienced professionals studied in this effort were professional pilots of a military 
helicopter, military high performance jet and mid-sized uninhabited aerial systems (UASs).  
These pilots frequently operate within a complex, rapidly shifting, time-pressured, information 
rich landscape.  In addition, the UAS pilots must cope with challenges associated with 
controlling their aircraft from afar.  Due to not being physically immersed in the aircraft’s 
environment, crews must piece together incomplete information to understand their fast-moving, 
dynamic and complex situation.  Although the information they receive is probably never quite 
sufficient, the UAS is still using large amounts of this data in order to detect and assess changes 
that, in traditional flight, are often hard to miss because the pilot is physically immersed in the 
aircraft environment.  All three types of pilots additionally deal with interruptions, complex 
interfaces and rapidly changing environments.  Another contributor on cognitive load is 
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technology.  As information technology advances, more and more of it and thus more and more 
information is being placed within the cockpits of both manned and unmanned aircraft to aid the 
pilot.   
The current study builds on an extensive body of work, dating back decades, that ex-
plores the nature of expertise.  A portion of this body of work will be reviewed in the pages that 
follow; the review highlights the role of knowledge structures in expertise and sets the stage for 
the presentation of a theory of sensemaking in which the knowledge structure is a central 
construct.  The theory’s presentation, in turn, sets the stage for introducing this study’s research 
methods, which are significantly influenced by the Data/Frame model.  A second theory also 
influenced the data analysis.  This theory, called the Contextual Control Model (COCOM), by 
Hollnagel (2002) will also be discussed in this study’s introduction. 
The Nature of Expertise  
Expert attributes that contribute to operating with large quantities of information in rich, 
dynamic environments are discussed by Chi (2006) in her synthesis of three decades of expertise 
research.  Chi presents a list of positive and negative characteristics of experts, which are 
presented below.   
Experts’ positive characteristics include the ability to excel in their area of expertise by 
detecting features that may be difficult for novices to see, experts spend more time than novices 
assessing the problem space before beginning to take action and generating an effective solution 
to problems more quickly and accurately than novices.  They are also able to detect errors 
because of increased self-monitoring; implement adaptive strategies, such as working backwards 
with difficult physics problems; and are opportunistic in strategically drawing upon all available 
information to generate an answer or solve a problem.  Experts are said to recognize and assess 
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the knowledge they need with minimal cognitive effort versus novices who expend effort 
searching for what information to attend to, something that could pose a major problem in 
aviation because many scenarios are time sensitive.   
Although it may seem counterintuitive to say that there are negative characteristics of 
expertise, Chi believes the domain specificity of expertise can be considered negative, that is, 
experts only excel in the area in which they have extensive experience.  Chi also sees the 
tendency to be overconfident as a problem because it can lead to biased and premature 
judgments and cause experts to overlook details.  Finally, according to Chi’s review, experts tend 
to underrate the performance of novices and may be slower than novices to adapt to new rule 
sets, which Chi terms as “inflexible” (p. 26). 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) focus on perception in expertise, describing how the percep-
tion of an environment changes as an individual progresses from novice to expert.  This 
progression happens naturally as the skills taught are relied on less than the actual experiences 
gained, resulting in an individual who can operate fluently in their respective domain.  Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus gathered and analyzed personal accounts of individuals studying foreign language, 
chess and flight instruction to understand the changes that occur in perceiving one’s environment 
when learning skills and attempting to reach expertise.  They concluded that in order to reach 
expertise learners must travel through five interlocking stages: novice, competence, proficiency, 
expertise and mastery.   
 According to Dreyfus and Dreyfus, during the novice stage, the individual sees context-
independent features in the surrounding environment and breaks down the environment into 
different features that do not yet have a meaning as a whole.  By monitoring the dynamics of the 
environment overtime, the individual will construct rules about features to guide his or her 
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behavior.  In the next stage, competence, the individual has gained experience and begins to 
perceive these features as a part of a larger context.  The features are now seen in meaningful 
context and patterns, referred to as aspects, and can be recognized.  Dreyfus and Dreyfus suggest 
instructors can establish action guidelines to aid students in assigning meaning to features and 
discovering patterns.  To form these guidelines, individuals will observe and gather as many 
aspects of the scenario as possible by not showing favoritism or wrongly treating some as more 
influential than others.  The third stage, proficiency, is marked by goals.  The individual now 
perceives the features of his or her task in terms of how they contribute to a final goal.   Here, 
individuals use maxims or memorized rules to determine the needed behavior for the specific 
scenario.  Finally, expertise is reached once the individual has the ability to recognize the 
appropriate action to a given situation immediately and without any aid.  Dreyfus and Dreyfus go 
further to say that mastery can be reached but only when the expert no longer pays close 
attention to his or her behavior and can fluently produce appropriate behavior because the 
individual relies on his past learning experiences.   
These stages of expertise development are important to understand during the formation 
of training programs.  They are also suggestive of the increasing capacity for handling 
complexity and information loads as expertise develops. As will be seen, Klein, Moon and 
Hoffman (2006) describe the goal of sensemaking in a way that is similar to Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus’s (1980) description of mastery, where the individual perceives his or her environment 
as a whole learned experience and not just in individual characteristics with no connection.   
Work by Ericsson and his colleagues also add to the understanding of expertise and how 
it develops.  In a comprehensive review, Ericsson and Lehman (1996) convey characteristics of 
experts that allow them to accomplish their goals effectively, most of the time.  In order to find 
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shared characteristics across experts, Ericsson and Lehman propose studying the behavior of 
experts, specifically, how they adapt to their environments across multiple domains.  They also 
believe that it is important to test experts’ ability to consistently reproduce advanced, skilled 
performance in order to understand the limits of expertise and that this research can be done by 
studying expert performance in controlled laboratory settings.  
The number of years of experience needed to reach peak performance varies by domain; 
for example, peak performance is reached in the earlier years in sport and athletic domains due to 
the physical stress placed on the body.  Many researchers hold that a minimum of ten years is 
needed to reach expertise in a domain (Ericsson & Lehman, 1996).  Ericsson, Krampe and 
Tesch-Römer (1993) additionally advocate deliberate, concentrated practice during that time 
period.   Their studies have shown that four hours a day of deliberate, concentrated practice can 
be executed before exhaustion has been reached.  Ericsson and Lehman’s (1996) main assertion 
is the importance of deliberate practice over innate ability in attaining expertise.   
Studies of exceptional memory have provided additional insight into the abilities and 
characteristics of experts.  The use of digit sequence recall is a popular laboratory experimental 
task used to study exceptional memory.  In one study, subject SF, an undergraduate, was quickly 
read digit sequences and then asked to recall as many digits as possible (Ericsson & Chase, 
1982).  If SF was correct, the experimenter added a single digit.  If SF was incorrect, the 
experimenter subtracted one digit.  This was repeated for a significant amount of time, roughly 
230 hours in the laboratory spanning 20 months.  They discovered that SF, an average student, 
was able to recall more digits as the testing continued.  SF was able to recall roughly eighty 
digits, whereas most people can recall seven to ten.  Expert mnemonists have not reached eighty 
digits, leading Ericsson and Chase to speculate how and why SF was able to recall these long 
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digit spans.  They discovered that SF was attaching meaning to certain number sequences, such 
as familiar running times he received in the past as a competitive track racer.  This investigation 
led to Skilled Memory Theory (Ericsson & Chase, 1982).  Skilled Memory Theory proposes that 
an individual can become an expert in memory recall by using short-term memory aids that build 
long-term memory.  According to Skilled Memory Theory, associating new information to 
already known material can aid in memorization.  The use of this strategy to boost memory for 
domain-specific information has been documented in studies of waitresses and waiters 
remembering drink and food orders (Bennet, 1983; Ericsson & Polson, 1988).  Skilled Memory 
Theory asserts that this technique extends the otherwise limited capacity of the working memory.  
Alan Baddeley (1992) defined working memory as, “a brain system that provides temporary 
storage and manipulation of the information necessary for such complex cognitive tasks as 
language comprehension, learning and reasoning” (p. 556).  Consistent with Ericsson and 
Lehman’s (1996) theory of deliberate practice and Ericsson and Chase’s (1982) skilled memory 
theory, Maguire, Valentine, Wilding and Kapur (2003) found that IQ scores and ability to recall 
faces and snowflakes do not relate to recall performance in memory champions.  These 
researchers demonstrated the importance of the cognitive strategy used.  They found that 
memory champions all used a memorization strategy called the method of loci, or mental walk, 
during the study phase of the memory tests whereby experts visually connect items to-be-
remembered to specific locations in a familiar setting as they walk through the setting.  Use of 
the method of loci is yet another case of experts using experience-based knowledge structures to 
benefit performance.  Because stimuli were novel and devoid of meaning, they did not match a 
mental pattern; consequently the expert mnemonists had learned to generate a framework – the 
familiar setting – and fit the information into it. 
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As part of the process of developing exceptional memory, students studied by Ericsson 
and Chase (1982) seemed to develop organizational structures in long-term memory.  Retrieval 
cues were mapped to the organizational structure; Ericsson and Chase refer to these as “retrieval 
structures.”  The strategic use of organizational structures is a frequent finding in studies on 
expert – novice differences (e.g. Chi, 2006; Lesgold et al., 1988) and is central to the goals of the 
present research.  
The Role of Organizing Knowledge Structures in Expertise 
This review will use many different terms to describe knowledge structures and mental 
models.  In particular some researchers refer to knowledge structures as frames (e.g., Klein et al., 
2006), while others refer to them as schemas and scripts (e.g., Bartlett, 1932, as cited in 
Roediger, Bergman, and Meade, 2000) and others use the term templates (Gobet and Clarkson, 
2004).  Despite their use of different terms, the researchers are referring to the fundamentally 
same construct.  The review will maintain the term used by each researcher describing their 
work.  Otherwise, the term ‘knowledge structure’ will be used.   
Numerous studies demonstrate the expert’s ability to use knowledge structures and 
techniques to handle complex and possibly large amounts of information.  Since the 1960s, the 
game of chess has been heavily studied to examine the characteristics of expertise.  Other 
domains studied to shed light on the role of knowledge structures include radiology and 
landmine detection.  According to this research, experts use knowledge structures to organize 
knowledge and incorporate new information.  They also help experts organize perceptual 
information into patterns that reflect regularities within the environment.  Examples of this use of 
knowledge structures are described below.  
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The Use of Mental Representations from Experience.  One of the ways experts seem 
to handle large amounts of information is by chunking, a construct introduced into researchers’ 
vocabulary by Miller (1956) and studied by many over the decades since.  Miller (1956) defined 
the term chunk as a “familiar unit” into which we organize or group information.  We may only 
hold a limited number of chunks within our working memory; however, we can increase working 
memory capacity by grouping more information together into larger and larger chunks.  
In order to research the size of chunks and how much information we are able to hold in 
these familiar units, expert chess players have been widely studied by researchers.  Chase and 
Simon (1973) investigated Miller’s Discrete Chunking Theory (1956) by studying master chess 
players’ ability to recognize patterns of the chess pieces in their working memory (WM) in order 
to choose the “next best move”.  Chase and Simon (1973) set out to discover chunk size in 
experts, the difference in number and size of chunks of master versus weaker players, and how 
many chunks could plausibly be held in their WM.   
In Chase and Simon’s work, three chess players, a master, a Class A player and a begin-
ner, performed a perception task and a memory task using twenty game board configurations 
including one random board configuration.  The configurations ranged from middle-game 
positions to end-game positions and included a configuration of randomly selected positions.  
The perception task featured two boards, side by side, separated by a partition blocking the view 
of the left board.  The right was a blank board for the participant to use to recreate the 
configurations modeled on the left board.  Upon removal of the partition, the participant was 
instructed to recreate the left game board configuration on the right board and was free to look at 
the left board as needed.  The memory task was similar to the perception task; however, the 
partition was replaced after five seconds of viewing the left board and the participant would 
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attempt to recreate the configuration from memory using the right board.  The participant was 
not time restricted when recreating the board.   The task was repeated with each game board 
configuration until the player reconstructed the model with a 100% accuracy. 
The memory task revealed that board reconstruction performance was related to rank of 
the individual; the master was able to remember more pieces correctly in a shorter amount of 
time and it took fewer trials to reach 100% accuracy when compared to the beginner and middle 
ranked player.  However, the recall of random positions produced no correlation between 
memory task performance and player skill level.  Class A and master players had worse recall of 
random positions than the beginners.   Chase and Simon hypothesized that random positions did 
not facilitate the experts’ use of chunks or recognition of patterns. 
Chase and Simon used the perception task to assess the size of the chess players’ chunks.  
To assess sizes of chunks using the perception task, Chase and Simon first looked at the amount 
of time between placements of pieces.  They hypothesized that long pauses would separate two 
different chunks and short pauses would mean the pieces belonged to the same chunk.  Chase 
and Simon discovered that masters are able to hold larger chunks of about five pieces, and that 
the number of chunks would be limited, just as for any other person, to a capacity of about seven 
plus or minus two items.   
Using probability analysis to assess glances, they determined players grouped pieces 
primarily on the basis of location, color and attack or defense relations among pieces.  Pieces 
related in these ways tended to follow one another in recall chains and tended to be separated by 
shorter pauses.  Surprisingly, this held true for randomly positioned pieces also.  They also 
discovered that with fewer similarities between pieces, the chess players needed longer glances 
in order to remember the positions in a given configuration.   Again using probability analysis, 
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they found that longer pauses, those over two seconds, indicated that different chunks were being 
used and that the similarities among the pieces in a given chunk were fewer.   
Gobet and Clarkson (2004) replicated Chase and Simon’s 1973 experiment; however, 
they used a computer-based chess game to account for the “hand size problem” that they 
hypothesized had affected Chase and Simon’s results.  Specifically, they wanted to test whether 
chess players in Chase and Simons’ study were limited in the number of pieces they could fit in a 
hand at one time.  Maybe pauses related more to hand size limits than to chunk limitations.  In 
addition, Gobet and Clarkson sought to use their results to compare predictions of Discrete 
Chunking Theory with Gobet and Simon’s (1996) Template Theory. 
Discrete Chunking Theory (Miller, 1956) and Template Theory, proposed by Gobet and 
Simon (1996), make different predictions about the number and size of chunks held in working 
memory.  Template theory suggests masters should be able to hold even larger chunks of fifteen 
pieces rather than those just the five proposed by Chase and Simon.  More specifically, Template 
Theory predicts that chunks are combined into a more encompassing type of knowledge structure 
called a Template.  Templates are described as organizing frameworks that tie together related 
chunks. 
Using the computerized version of Chase and Simon’s perception and memory tasks, 
Gobet and Clarkson discovered their participants tended to recreate larger, but fewer, chunks in 
comparison to Chase and Simon’s findings.  Using two different presentation techniques, a 
computer and real-life chessboards, the experimenters assessed their hypotheses about the hand-
size confound in the Chase and Simon experiments.  They hypothesized that if chunking theory 
explains expert chess memory, chunks should not exceed four to five pieces for both real-life 
chessboard and computer presentation conditions.  On the other hand, if template theory explains 
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expert chess memory, the real-life chessboard presentation condition would produce smaller 
chunks due to hand limitations and the computerized presentation condition would produce 
larger chunks (sometimes more than 15 pieces in size).   
Gobet and Clarkson’s participants were given two different tasks, a copy task and a recall 
task for both the real-life chessboard presentation condition and the computerized presentation 
condition.  During the copy task, they were allowed to switch back and forth between the model 
board and their reconstruction board as much as they wanted.  The recall task restricted the 
participants to viewing the model board for only five seconds before reconstructing what they 
could.  They hypothesized that more glances to the model board meant smaller chunks were 
being used, whereas if the participant had longer glances, fewer, larger chunks were being used. 
Gobet and Clarkson’s results suggested that template theory gives a more accurate 
account of the organizational structure and capacity of working memory.  Specifically, they 
found that in the real-life chessboard presentation condition, participants looked at the board for 
a short period of time before placing a few pieces on the reconstruction board.  In the 
computerized presentation condition, the participants examined the board longer before placing a 
greater number of pieces on the reconstruction board.  Gobet and Clarkson believed this was due 
to the use of fewer, larger chunks.   
Gobet and Clarkson found that experts are able to hold larger chunks in working memory 
when recreating positions if they are not limited by hand-size. Thus this research provides 
evidence that the original chunking theory underestimated the size of chunks used by masters, 
and supported the template theory.  As Chase and Simon before them, Gobet and Clarkson 
demonstrated that regardless of any basic limitation on the number of items that can be held in 
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our working memory, experts can overcome those limits by the use of large chunks, i.e. 
templates.   
According to Gobet and Clarkson, it is possible that experts use chunks as proposed by 
Simon and Chase; however, the chunks are larger than Simon and Chase estimated, allowing for 
more information to be comprehended.  In addition to the suggested expertise research is the use 
of search-ahead techniques where the player “plans by looking ahead at possible moves, possible 
responses by the opponent, possible responses to those responses, and so on” (Gobet & Simon, p. 
3).  To examine whether expert chess players recognize patterns and features to guide their 
choice of moves or if they engage in look-ahead search to determine possible moves, world 
champion Gary Kasparov was studied by Gobet and Simon (1996).  Kasparov was allowed to 
prepare for the games in the experiment by studying past games of his opponents to learn where 
his opponents regularly made mistakes.  While normal chess play is held to three minutes for 
each move, Gobet and Simon (1996) limited Kasparov to three minutes for each round of chess. 
This short amount of time was used to force Kasparov to depend on recognition of his 
opponents’ mistakes, and not allow the use of a "search ahead" technique.  He played against six 
opponents who were allowed the normal three minutes to respond to a move by Kasparov.  
Armed with the knowledge of their play characteristics, Kasparov tried to push his opponents 
into compromising positions he learned by studying their mistakes from past games.  They found 
that even due to the limited time Kasparov was allotted, he was still able to play at the 
grandmaster level presumably by using recognition cues of mistakes.   
Chabris and Hearst (2003) challenged Gobet and Simon’s assertion that expert chess 
players engage in recognition processes by examining the results of twenty-three grandmasters.  
They assessed chess playing during six tournament events between 1993 and 1998 in which 
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game playing was blindfolded (no sight of pieces’ actual positions; only an empty board on a 
computer screen was provided) or rapid (normal rules however time restrictions added).   These 
events were compared to classical play results by the same pairs of players during other events.   
Using ChessBase, a database of game play and results, Chabris and Hearst determined 
that grandmasters made fewer errors during classical games where they are allowed more time 
and actual sight of the board.  The results supported their hypothesis that when allowed more 
time, chess players engage in forward search to enhance performance.  However, there was no 
significant difference in amount or magnitude of errors during blindfolded play versus rapid 
play.  They suggest that both pattern recognition and searching ahead are influential to chess 
skill.  While they cannot firmly suggest chunking theories are influential, they do support the 
notion that organizational knowledge structures, which support pattern recognition and search-
ahead, are fundamental to effective expert performance.  
The main findings from the review of chess literature support the present research on use 
of an organizational knowledge structure to enhance expert ability within a domain.  They also 
shed light on techniques the knowledge structures make possible, whether these are searching 
ahead for patterns or the immediate recognition of patterns from memory.  Expert aviators in the 
present study may also use an organizational knowledge structure built from experience to 
handle the incoming information and support immediate recognition of patterns. 
Schema Use.  Research on expertise in the field of radiology is relevant to the current 
research on expertise in aviation due to the perceptual demands the experts in both domains are 
required to deal with.  Lesgold et al. (1988) examined radiologists and radiology residents in 
their naturalistic work setting.  The participants were novice (first and second year radiology 
residents) and experts (radiologists with ten or more years following residency).  The first 
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experiment was similar to their daily operations where they examined x-rays and orally reported 
their diagnosis.  After not finding differences among diagnoses that aligned with level of 
experience, they conducted a second experiment in the same setting but required them to circle 
areas of the x-rays influential to their diagnoses.   
In the initial study, expert doctors, first-year and second-year radiology residents were 
instructed to not only assess and report orally diagnoses of x-rays, but to also draw circles around 
the patterns in each x-ray on which they were basing their diagnosis.  Out of fifteen films, the 
experimenters focused on three films that were known to be difficult to analyze.  The researchers 
assessed and compared the x-ray markings and verbal protocol of the diagnostic process.  The 
researchers determined that all participants generated a mental representation or schema of the 
case to guide the diagnosis process.  The novices and experts differed in the form and use of 
schemas; the novices were resistant to change their schema in the face of conflicting data.  
Lesgold et al. (1988) state, experts “immediately begin searching for schema to guide [their] 
thinking…[they] didn’t just accept that schema but kept trying both to test and elaborate it” (p. 
319).  Not only do expert radiologists seem to use schema to support the processes of assessment 
and diagnosis, but they also seem to produce them fairly quickly to guide the process of 
organizing information.  In contrast, novices tend to jump to their initial answer, accepting the 
first diagnosis they reach.   
In order to study this more in depth, Lesgold et al. employed the second experiment 
requiring the participants to trace x-ray features, both normal and abnormal, as they considered 
them in their diagnoses.  What they found were novices making errors related to a failure to 
notice subtle perceptual details in the x-rays.  Experts noticed different densities in an x-ray, 
relating such patterns to x-rays from past patients and diagnoses.  Using their schema, experts 
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also seem to correctly explain away irrelevant information that led to misdiagnoses by the 
novices.  The ability of experts to critically evaluate incoming information and use it to guide 
continued sensemaking is described as “opportunistic” by Lesgold et al. and as crucial in medical 
diagnosis.  In the present study, it was expected that expert aviators would similarly be found to 
use their schema to guide perception and sensemaking about complex and possibly ambiguous 
situations. 
Expert ability to adapt behaviors.  Research on landmine detection expertise 
(Staszewski, 2000; as cited in Cooke & Durso, 2008) revealed that experts use mental 
representations sparked from past experiences not only to aid them in pattern recognition and 
sensemaking, but also to adapt their behavior accordingly.  Since expert landmine detection 
requires both human skill and technology, it is important to find where the two diverge in order 
to understand the techniques used.  Staszewski studied the performance of two expert mine 
detectors to determine the strategies used by successful landmine detection experts and thus aid 
new training techniques.  Seventy-one landmines were randomly placed within four different 
“lanes” and one of the lanes also included plastic mine dummies.  The two participants, RR and 
WS, were given the AN/19 PSS-12 detection device; the same used by US forces.  The devices 
provide an auditory signal when conducting material entered the small sensor field on the 
detection device.  The event was video recorded to capture the participants’ view, the devices’ 
output and the concurrent verbal reports made by both individuals.  The participants were not 
constrained to time limits nor methods of detection, they were only told to voice their thought 
processes aloud (a technique for studying expert cognitive performance), search as quickly as 
possible, place a poker chip as close to the middle of the located landmine as possible, attempt to 
minimize false alarms, and attempt to maximize landmine detection.  Each participant was tested 
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once on each of the four lanes.  After completion, the participants rated their confidence in their 
accuracy.   
Both experts performed above average; however, more interesting were the methods they 
used.  Staszewski characterized their behavior as consistent with three goals: search, investigate, 
and decide.  Searching consisted of sweeping over an area, listening for auditory signals from the 
devices while slowly changing the sweeping location to ensure overlap if a signal was not heard.  
The experts excelled in search because they had adapted their behavior by enhancing the 
sensitivity of the device by lowering the search head so their sweeps were in direct contact with 
the surface of the ground, not slightly above.   They also did not cover large areas with fast 
movements; rather, they only slowly covered three-square meters at a time.  This was especially 
important due to the variability of the auditory outputs if conductive soil was found.  The 
participants then investigated whether the outputs from the device were reliable, or if they were 
simply due to conductive soil.  As during search, they used small, overlapping sweeping 
movements to investigate the reliability of the device outputs.  In addition, to aid memory of 
what ground had already been covered and where the device sounded, directions were spoken 
aloud in regards to some landmark, such as a pebble.  This continued until a satisfactory, steady 
output was heard from the device.  Then a conceptual four-point box was mentally constructed 
around the periphery of the auditory outputs and a 2-dimensional mental map of the device 
output pattern mentally envisioned within the box.  By fixing the head of the device at a 30-
degree angle above the ground and sweeping wider around the envisioned four – point box, the 
experts assessed the auditory pattern within a clearly defined perimeter and stored it as a mental 
map.  The final goal, decide, involved comparing the newly produced mental map with patterns 
of landmine locations stored in memory from past experience.  Both experts were able to make 
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inferences about the size and shape of objects causing the device to sound.  Staszewski asserts 
that experts and novices differ in the number of stored patterns and the ease with which the new 
patterns are produced and compared.  Staszewski’s research with RR and WS led to the 
development of Cognitive Engineering Based on Expert Skill (CEBES) as a new training method 
for landmine detection.   
Once again, research on experts highlights the instrumental role of knowledge structures 
to store knowledge of past experiences in ways that support rapid and fluent data collection, 
situation assessment and response.  The present study investigates the role of the knowledge 
structures in fast-paced aviation domains.  In addition, the results of this study may suggest 
changes or additions that could improve the Data/Frame Sensemaking Theory.  
Data/Frame Theory 
 A theory that addresses how people use knowledge structures to handle and make sense 
of complex situations is Klein’s Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking (e.g., Klein, Phillips, Rall, 
& Peluso, 2007; Klein, Moon & Hoffman, 2006; Sieck, Klein, Peluso, Smith & Harris, 2007).  
The sensemaking theory centers around the use of frames to organize incoming data.  The theory 
builds upon Klein’s earlier work on naturalistic decision-making and his development of the 
theory of Recognition-Primed Decision Making (RPD; e.g. Klein, Calderwood & MacGregor, 
1989).  RPD asserts decisions are made by recognizing familiar details of a situation.  
Sensemaking further elaborates by declaring activities that occur if and when details are 
recognized.  
Frames and Mental Models. Central to the Data-Frame Theory is the knowledge 
organization construct, the frame.   According to Klein, Phillips, Rall and Peluso (2007) a frame 
is “a structure for accounting for the data and guiding the search for more data, where the data 
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are the ‘interpreted signals of events’” (p. 118).  Frames serve to integrate incoming data with 
other elements in the environment or scenario and with past relevant experience.  
Frames equate with schemas, a construct with a relatively long history in psychology.  
The schema construct goes back to one of the earliest references in the work of Bartlett (1932; as 
cited in Roediger et al. 2000), who proposed a theory about the role of the schema in memory. 
Bartlett conducted experiments to study memory, most notably his “War of the Ghosts” 
experiments.  Based on his research, memories are not so much recalled as reconstructed and that 
when reconstructed, memories tend to be changed to better fit our cultural biases, ways of 
thinking about the world, and schemas.  According to Bartlett, schemas represent generic 
knowledge about our surroundings.  This generic knowledge influences new memories.  He held 
that if incoming information does not fit a person’s schema, the individual adapts the information 
until it fits.  The problem with using one’s own general knowledge to reconstruct a story from 
memory is that many details about what actually happens are replaced by generalizations based 
on knowledge of what usually happens, leading to memory errors.  
Mental models are another knowledge structure construct with a role in Klein’s da-
ta/frame theory.  Klein at al. (2007) defines mental models as “our causal understanding of the 
way things work” (p. 130).  According to Klein at al., “they are another form that frames can 
take, along with stories, scripts and maps and so on.  They can be stories, as when we imagine 
the sequence of events from stepping on a brake pedal to slowing down the velocity of our car” 
(p.130).  Mental models are a type of frame that focuses on the dynamic relationships and 
interactions among elements in a scenario in order to tell a story.  Mental models can be quickly 
configured in order to understand cause and effect relationships in dynamic scenarios. 
Description of the Data/Frame theory 
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The conceptualization of sensemaking proposed by Klein and his colleagues (e.g., Klein, 
Phillips, Rall, & Peluso, 2007; e.g. see fig. 1) is their Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking.  
According to this theory, in order to understand a situation, people first begin with a frame that 
helps shape and organize incoming data.  Certain cues or anchors within the scenario are 
recognized by the individual in order to elicit a frame.  This is where expertise and experience 
may have a major impact.  This frame may represent a typical scenario or it may be constructed 
from multiple fragments of frames in order to adapt to and handle a new scenario.  The 
relationship between data and frame is symbiotic: the established frame defines the relevant data 
and incoming data cause the frame to be adapted.  The diagram in Figure 1 clearly displays this 
relationship.  The right side refers to ways the data affect the frame while the left is how the 
frame affects the data.   A unique characteristic of the sensemaking theory is the stress put on the 
“active” individual.  Individuals are not passively absorbing information in their environment; 
rather, they continually assess and determine what cues and anchors are relevant and important.  
Klein and his colleagues describe a frame as a hypothesis about the current situation.  Klein and 
his colleagues describe the theory as a “closed-loop transition” between explaining the data that 
are currently present and anticipating what data are to come.  A frame allows a person to not 
only decide if the current data are sufficient or not, but to also project into the future what data 
will be needed.  Individuals may engage in seeking data to add to the understanding of the 
situation and these data are added to the active frame.  By seeking data, elaborating and 
questioning the frame, the individual assesses whether the frame (hypothesis) is a good fit to the 
data.  Individuals may engage in preserving the frame, where inconsistent data are explained 
away, or in questioning the frame, where the frame is recognized as inconsistent with the 
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incoming information.  If a frame is no longer a good fit, reframing occurs so that frame once 
again fits the data.  
It is important to note that, despite the cyclical appearance of the model (e.g. see fig. 1), a 
strict cycle does not need to be followed in order to make sense of a situation.  Klein et al. (2007) 
stress that any place can act as the starting point of sensemaking; it simply depends on the 
situation.  
!
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Figure 1. Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking (2007).  This figure illustrates the sensemaking 
activities involved in the Data/Frame Theory.  
In order to dispel the notion that the model is simply “common sense,” and convey its 
importance to the understanding of cognition and information processing, Klein, Moon and 
Hoffman (2006) present five areas where the Data/Frame Theory is more than just simple 
common sense.  First, they stress that individuals resist examining the entire situation to make 
sense of their current environment.  They would much rather select “simple chains of cause and 
effect” (p. 89) relationships to assess a situation, however, this often leads to oversimplification 
of the situation.  Secondly, the Data/Frame theory relates forming a hypothesis to establishing a 
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frame.  It is important that the frame be chosen early in order to facilitate deliberate testing of its 
appropriateness and so that incoming data can be evaluated in a meaningful context.  Thirdly, 
feedback is crucial in decision-making and especially when it allows the person to understand 
what about the sensemaking and decision-making was wrong or right and not just whether the 
decision itself was wrong or right.  Klein et al. (2006) assert that the value of valid feedback 
tends not to be adequately appreciated; as seen in Figure 1, all sensemaking activities can benefit 
from feedback. Fourthly, sensemaking cannot be treated as a skill where every step of the 
process is separate and can be taught.  Sensemaking is a complex, multifaceted, process that 
cannot be pulled apart into consecutive steps or other separable components.  Finally, 
sensemaking is not simply about confirming or disconfirming information.  Sensemaking is also 
about being able to shift attention to a better fitting frame when the accuracy of a frame is 
questioned. 
The importance of Klein’s sensemaking model to this research cannot be stressed 
enough, thus it will be described further by walking through the activities shown in Figure 1.  
Examples of research questions that are addressed by the current study will be embedded 
throughout the model description.   
An individual will usually notice and choose a frame based on three or four cues, which 
Klein refers to as anchors.  Klein et al. (2007) point out that the environment, individual 
characteristics, and available information will additionally influence the frame that is chosen.  
Once a frame has been chosen, it is a source of expectations that the individual uses to actively 
seek information that relates to the frame.  This additional information supports elaboration of 
the frame where slots may be added and filled with matching data from the environment and 
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where inferences may be made.  In addition, existing frame slots are filled as key data about the 
environment are perceived. 
Information that does not map to (or fit) the frame may be ignored; if given attention, this 
unexpected information may cause the individual to question the frame.  The expectancies 
created by the frame may be recognized as violated and an adjustment to the frame or a switch to 
a different frame may occur.  For example, this may occur when a pilot switches from a landing 
frame to a “go-around” frame when cues begin to indicate a successful landing may not be 
possible.   
If the individual is preserving a frame, he or she is explaining away data that conflicts 
with the chosen frame instead of adapting the frame or choosing a new one to accommodate the 
data.  Sometimes individuals need to compare an opposing frame to the originally chosen frame.  
This can aid in breaking free of fixation on a given frame and is widely seen in medical diagnosis 
where symptoms are evaluated in the context of different possible diseases (i.e., in these frames) 
until the correct diagnosis is realized and treatment can be given.  Klein, Pliske, Crandall and 
Woods (2005) describe the inability of inexperienced nurses to arrive at a correct diagnosis and 
attribute this to an appropriate mental model, i.e., frame.  When the same cues were available, 
the inexperienced nurses only used initial surface symptoms to diagnose an ill infant, instead of 
comparing all of the symptoms to past cases.  The nurses fixated on the surface symptoms 
instead of gathering all available information and comparing it to past knowledge.  
To properly interpret new data that are incongruous with the active frame, reframing must 
occur; preserving the frame stops and a new frame is chosen.  Previously discarded data may 
now fit the new frame and goals may need to be re-evaluated.  If the data do not fit the new 
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frame or the frame cannot explain the data adequately, another frame will be sought.  Once 
again, anchors come into play; however this time, they likely are those cues that triggered 
recognition of the need for a new frame.!   
Challenging Aviation Operations 
Complex systems are characterized by elements that are “dynamic, simultaneous, paral-
lel, and organic (evolving, emerging) rather than governed by simple cause and effect” 
(Feltovich, Hoffman, Woods, & Roesler, 2004, p. 91).  Aviation is considered a complex domain 
because multiple events that are highly interactive are occurring at once while the pilot flies the 
aircraft.  Furthermore, UAV operations are seen as highly complex for that same reason; 
additionally, UAS pilots do not have the multiple rich sensory inputs experienced by other pilots 
to increase the level of awareness during flight.  Operators cannot smell or hear the engine to be 
warned of complications; nor are they tactilely stimulated to support awareness and problem 
detection, e.g., a drift from course into weather or turbulence (e.g., Williams, 2008).  The 
environment is seen as dense because of the number of things occurring at once and extent of 
changing details.  Operators must rely on what they can see through a limited camera view.  
Predator UAS pilots are provided with a 30-degree view lacking depth perception and peripheral 
vision (Pestana, 2009).   
Military operations are an example of highly complex scenarios.  While the pilot follows 
standard operations and procedures, other variables can alter the goals of the mission forcing the 
pilot to quickly adjust.  
Qualitative Research 
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 Three types of validity were considered important to this qualitative research: descriptive 
validity, interpretive validity and theoretical validity (Johnson, 1997).  Descriptive validity refers 
to, “the factual accuracy of the account as reported by the qualitative researcher” (p.284).  In the 
present research, descriptive validity was addressed by two interviewers conducting the 
interviews and two coders coding the raw transcribed data.  Interpretive validity refers to, “the 
degree that the participants’ viewpoints, thoughts, intentions, and experiences are accurately 
understood and reported by the qualitative researcher” (p.284).  Interpretive validity was also 
addressed by two coders coding the raw data of the transcribed interviews.  Theoretical validity 
refers to, “the degree that the participants’ viewpoints, thoughts, intentions, and experiences are 
accurately understood and reported by the qualitative researcher” (p. 285).  Theoretical validity 
may be more difficult to obtain than descriptive and interpretive because it deals with the how 
and why of events which can be ambiguous.  The current research on cognitive information 
processing has been studied and theorized by many psychologists, however per the results, 
Klein’s data/frame theory clarifies this processing with military aviation complexity.  The 
researchers viewed demonstrations of UAV operations and spoke with UAV subject matter 
experts (SMEs) in the domain aiding descriptive and interpretive validity.  Also, two coders 
coded the interview data chunks in an attempt to gain investigator triangulation, where multiple 
investigators must collect and analyze the data, to minimize bias throughout the consideration of 
multiple perspectives. 
This research follows a design similar to that used by Klein and Jarosz (2011).  Klein and 
Jarosz studied insights, or “discontinuous discoveries” (p. 335), in the natural environment to 
understand how insights develop.  They stress the explorative nature of their study due to the 
innovativeness and the ability for future studies to build off their findings.  Klein and Jarosz 
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collected 120 incidents from interviews, observations, personal events and other media such as 
books, newspapers and magazine articles.  They then coded the incidents using fourteen features 
such as whether or not the individual made a connection between pieces of information or if they 
attempted to explain away or explore a contradiction in their thinking.  Two coders 
independently coded the data, and then, together, reevaluated and adjusted the codes.  The 
intentions of Klein and Jarosz were similar to the present research in wanting to explore the 
cognitive functions of individuals versus testing a hypothesis.  Finally, they found most insights 
originated from connections and contradictions and not an attempt to explain away the 
contradicting evidence therefore insights occur when a person shifts their attention to discover 
how things happen in their current environment.  Individuals use insights to revisit or reframe 
their current frame in the face of new information. 
Research Approach 
This research approach followed Klein et al.’s critical decision method (CDM; e.g., 
Flanagan, 1954; Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989), which is a semi-structured interview 
method using the recounting of past incidents to elicit knowledge from experts during 
challenging events within their domain.  Challenging incidents are a rich source of data about 
cognitive work because they tend to require a wider variety of attentional strategies, the 
processing of a greater amount of information, more difficult decisions, and so forth.  They are 
also used because they are more memorable to the individual, and thus the interviewee is able to 
recount actual details of actual events from memory.  This reduces the tendency of interviewees 
to broadly state how they think they typically do something, a type of account that is more 
vulnerable to inaccuracy.  Concerning validity, CDM validity can be difficult to judge because 
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the exact circumstances cannot be recreated and once the event is related, the individual’s 
memory of such event is forever altered in their memory.   
Overview 
While the expert domains described above in the review of literature can be intense, they 
are not exactly like military aviation, which can be very demanding and time pressured.  Military 
aviation and UAS events used in the present research are characterized by the lack of 
proprioceptive sensations, incomplete data and time-pressured decision making as discussed 
earlier.  
In this research effort, pilot interviews were analyzed using an analysis framework based 
on Klein’s sensemaking model in an effort to obtain an improved understanding of professionals’ 
ability to handle large amounts of incoming data.  The proposed research follows the 
methodological philosophy expressed by Pepperberg (2008).  Pepperberg agrees for the 
importance of observing and learning before hypothesizing and, even then, she argues, the “truly 
interesting questions” often don’t translate into traditional testable hypotheses.  She believes the 
emphasis on testable hypotheses leads to scientists attempting to “prove” their point instead of 
trying to further knowledge and understanding.  Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) extend this line of 
argument or logic stating, “descriptive data, while precise and replicable, might seem to lack the 
objectivity and quantifiability produced by controlled laboratory experiments.  However, there is 
a long tradition in psychology and philosophy of suspicion of the significance of experimental 
results produced by restricting experiments to precisely controlled but highly artificial situations” 
(p. 2). 
Research Questions 
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The overarching goals of this research were to assess professional pilots in military high 
performance vehicles to understand how and how much they are able to do versus the limits of 
working memory, contribute to expertise literature regarding characteristics and abilities of 
experts, and finally to evaluate Klein’s data/frame theory of sensemaking.  In addition, specific 
questions that were investigated include the following:  
1. What types of sensemaking activities are used the most frequently in military aviation?  
2. Sieck et al. (2007) assert experts use three to four cues to elicit a frame.  Are three to four 
cues sufficient to trigger a change? 
3. How does Klein’s sensemaking theory compare with the sensemaking activity patterns 
found in the data of UAS and manned pilots? 
4. Do the patterns found in the data suggest any additions to the theory? 
5. Under what conditions do experts tend to be more likely to question a frame in the face of 
contradictory data?  When do they tend to be more likely to preserve the frame? 
 Method 
Participants 
Four experienced pilots of high performance aircraft (to be referred to as Pilot A, B, C & 
D) participated.  Pilots’ ages ranged from 35 to 50 years old.  The pilots’ flying experience 
ranged from 0 hours to 4500 hours in unmanned aerial systems (M = 1,355 hours) and 1914 
hours to 5150 hours in traditional aircraft (M = 2,823 hours; see Table 1).   
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Table 1 
Participant Flight Hours 
 Pilot A Pilot B Pilot C Pilot D 
Flying 
Experience 
(hrs) 
UAS: 200 
Traditional: 
1915 
UAS: 0  
Traditional 
5150 
UAS: 720 
Traditional: 
2250 
UAS: 4500 
Traditional: 
1980 
 
Each pilot completed a biographical questionnaire about his relevant training and experi-
ence (see Appendix A) prior to participating in an interview lasting one to two hours. The pilots 
were also asked for permission to audio tape their interviews and were additionally asked to read 
and sign a consent form explaining their rights as research participants. 
Although a sample size of four may be considered low for quantitative research, small 
sample sizes are common in qualitative research.  Validity concerns associated with low sample 
sizes and the interpretation of qualitative data are addressed in this study using strategies listed in 
Table 2.  In the present study, a sample size of four was able to shed light on sensemaking 
strategies used to detect, assess, and respond to challenging flight events and scenarios and to 
compare the strategies with Klein’s data/frame sensemaking theory.  
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Table 2 
Johnson’s Strategies to Gain Validity with Qualitative Research 
Strategy Definition Current Research 
Low Inference Descriptors 
 
The use of description phrased 
very close to the participants’ 
accounts and researchers’ field 
notes.  Verbatims (i.e. direct 
quotations) are a commonly 
used type of low inference 
descriptors.  
 
Verbatim – direct quotes (raw 
data) of the participants’ 
interviews used when coded 
by the coders  
 
Low Inference Descriptors  
 
The use of multiple 
investigators (i.e. multiple 
researchers) in collecting and 
interpreting data. 
 
At least two researchers 
present when interviews were 
conducted 
 
Theory Triangulation 
 
The use of multiple theories 
and perspectives to help 
interpret and explain the data. 
 
Multiple expert vs. novice 
theories and research used to 
explain behavior. 
 
Peer Review 
 
Discussion of the researcher’s 
interpretations and 
conclusions with other people.  
This includes discussion with 
a “disinterested peer” (e.g. 
with another researcher not 
directly involved.)  
 
Discussion with SMEs 
prevalent with no benefit 
gained from research, 
discussion with committee and 
presentations at conferences. 
 
Pattern Matching 
 
Predicting a series of results 
that form a “pattern” and then 
determining the degree to 
which the actual results fit the 
predicted pattern.  
 
Pattern in activities of 
sensemaking model. 
 
 
Data Collection  
 Each CDM interview was jointly conducted by two to three researchers.  The interviews 
(with Pilot C) were conducted in conference rooms with three researchers and the pilots seated 
around a conference table.  One interview was conducted over the phone by three researchers 
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(Pilot A).  The other interviews were conducted outdoors.  One of the two (Pilot B’s) was 
conducted by two researchers who sat on benches facing toward the pilot at a small round patio 
table.  The other (Pilot D’s) was conducted at an outdoor bench by two researchers who sat 
angled toward the pilot, one on the bench and the other on the ground next to the bench.   
In each interview, the pilot was asked to think of a past difficult, and therefore memora-
ble, event that was complex, fast-paced and involved the handling of high amounts of 
information.  The pilots were asked to recount the details from the past event and to try to 
describe what they were perceiving, thinking, and doing as they talked through the event (See 
interview protocol in Appendix B).  The researchers listened and took notes while occasionally 
asking for clarification when needed.  After the pilot finished talking through the event, the 
researchers went back through the event with the pilot.  During this second run through, the pilot 
was asked to correct, clarify, and elaborate on details of the account, especially those details 
about decision making, information they were seeking, ignoring or anticipating and how they 
were receiving such information.  Time permitting, a second memorable event was chosen and 
recounted using the same protocol.  All CDM interviews were audio taped using two recorders 
and each recording was transcribed. 
Data Analysis 
Transcribed interviews were segmented into data chunks, each consisting of a single idea 
or concept. The order of the data chunks was maintained for coding so that the context of each 
event was maintained. 
 Coders.  The interview chunks were coded by two coders.  Coders were the author and 
an educator in Human Factors.  Both were knowledgeable about Klein’s sensemaking theory, 
human performance theory that emphasizes control loops (e.g., Hollnagel & Woods, 2005; 
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Worm, 1999), and factors that affect the validity of qualitative research (e.g., Johnson, 1997).  
Coders worked to obtain consistency in their coding by iteratively coding small sets of data 
chunks, then reviewing and discussion code choices.  This process led to changes in coding 
practices and also to changes in codes.   
 Codes. The codes used to categorize and assess the interview data chunks represent 
sensemaking activities specified by Klein’s sensemaking theory.  These codes, shown in Table 3, 
were derived by the principal investigator and educator in Human Factors.  In addition to the 
sensemaking codes, a second set of codes was derived from Hollnagel’s (2002) Contextual 
Control Model (COCOM).  These codes, shown in Table 4 and Appendix C, allowed the coding 
analysis to capture contextual factors that influence information processing attentional 
requirements, such as time pressure, clarity of outcome feedback, and understanding of the 
relationships and dynamics that influence the outcome feedback.  If, during the coding process, 
codes did not map to all data, code adaptations and additions were made to improve the fit of the 
codes to the data.   
Table 3 
Codes Derived From Klein’s Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking.  
Codes Codes Definition 
Define a Frame 
(DF) 
- Reference goals, constraints, or structural characteristics known 
about the current situation, i.e., captured in the active frame.  
Seek or choose a 
frame (SF) 
- Use anchor(s) to 
elicit frame 
- Use experience 
and context to 
elicit frame (not 
specified by Sieck 
 
- Use cues or pieces of data to elicit a frame. (Cues and data used 
to elicit a frame are considered anchors.).  
 
- Use the context of current activities and conditions combined 
with knowledge of procedures and patterns to elicit a frame that 
anticipates the next situation or goal.  
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et al.) 
Confirm and 
elaborate the frame 
(CEF) 
- Seek data!
- Draw inferences 
and conclusions 
that extend the 
frame!
- Fill data slots in 
frame !
- Add slots to the 
frame!
- Combine 
fragments of 
frames!
- Use pre-existing 
knowledge to fill 
data slots!
 
- Take effortful actions to obtain data (versus just use what is 
given via communications or display); assess understanding of 
situation to determine whether more data are needed. 
 
- Use information to draw inferences and conclusions. 
 
- Use newly received information. 
 
- Reorganize the need for a piece or type of information not 
previously considered relevant or useful. 
 
- When situations have not been encountered previously or vary in 
fundamental ways each time they’re encountered, a single useful 
frame may not exist and a person may draw from multiple 
fragments of frames to support sensemaking. 
 
- Use knowledge one already has about the type of event or 
situation that is ongoing. 
Preserve the frame 
(PF) 
- Explain away, minimize the importance of, ignore, or distort data 
that does not fit the current chosen frame.   
Question the frame 
(QF) 
- Question the 
quality 
- Test the 
frame 
- Recognize a 
Violated 
expectancy 
 
- Question whether or not the incoming data fits the active frame. 
 
- Seek confirmation of data from a second or third source. 
 
- Test frame by comparing the results of actions and interactions 
with frame-based predictions. 
 
- Notice that incoming information does not fit predictions derived 
from the active frame, data slots, or expected slot values and, 
consequently, question the active frame’s appropriateness. 
Compare the frame 
with alternative 
frames 
- Identify alternative frames, collect evidence to evaluate 
alternative frames, or directly test the most likely alternative 
frame (e.g., by taking actions and assessing whether the result is 
what’s predicted for a given frame). 
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Reframe 
- Adapt the 
active frame 
- Elicit or 
construct a 
new frame 
- Frame adaptations can involve establishing new anchors, 
recognizing previously discarded data as relevant, or revising 
goals. 
 
- Eliciting or constructing a new frame supports sensemaking 
recovery, a term Seick et al. use to describe the recognition of a 
situation for what it really is, versus, for example, what a per-
ceiver expected or wanted it to be.   !
Table 4 
Worm’s Adaptation of Hollnagel’s COCOM Control Modes and Characteristics (1999; derived 
from Hollnagel and Woods, 2005)!
 
 
Control 
Mode 
Main Characteristics 
Subjective-
ly 
available 
time 
Familiari-
ty of 
situation 
Level of 
attention 
Number 
of goals 
Choice of 
next 
action 
Evaluation 
of outcome 
Strategic Abundant Routine or 
novel 
Medium - 
high 
Several Prediction 
based 
Elaborate 
Tactical 
(Attended) 
Limited, 
but 
adequate 
Routine, 
but not 
quite – or 
task is 
very 
important 
Medium – 
high 
Several, 
but limited 
Plan based Normal 
details 
Tactical 
(Unattend-
ed) 
More than 
adequate 
Very 
familiar or 
routine- or 
almost 
boring 
Low Several, 
but limited 
Associa-
tion based 
Perfunctory 
Opportunis-
tic 
Short or 
inadequate 
Vaguely 
familiar 
but not 
fully 
recognized 
High One or two 
(compet-
ing) 
Associa-
tion based 
Concrete 
Scrambled Very 
limited 
Situation 
not 
Full - 
hyperatten-
One Random Rudimen-
tary 
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recognized tion 
 
 Coding.  The coders only coded data chunks related to the past events recounted by the 
pilots; other data in the transcripts were disregarded.  Data chunks were coded in sequence, from 
the beginning to the end of each event transcript, so that the context in which each chunk occurs 
was not lost.  An example is provided in Appendix D.  Data chunks were first decided by the 
author and then discussed with the second coder.   The chunks were decided by the pilot’s 
account of an idea and/or action.  If multiple actions were involved in one idea, all were 
separated to ensure proper recognition was given to the amount of tasks occurring.  Once a total 
of 718 chunks were decided upon, each coder coded individually.  After initial codes were 
completed, both coders met to discuss and review to reach a final, reconciled code.  The initial 
interview, Pilot A, 72.06% of the interview was reviewed together, the highest percentage to 
ensure the coders were in agreement on the coding method.  For Pilot B, 61.81% of the interview 
was reviewed together; for Pilot C, 40.32% of the interview was reviewed together and finally, 
for Pilot D, 71.82% of the interview was reviewed together.  Overall, the coders reviewed 
54.97% of the data chunks together.  The primary researcher reviewed the remaining codes 
independently to decide the final reconciled code.  If a large discrepancy was discovered, the 
primary researched discussed with the other coder on a case-by-case basis.  
 Coding reliability. To assess the reliability of the coding, the coding results from the two 
coders (including the author) were compared by calculating Cohen’s kappa; suitable for coding 
regarding behavior using nominal scales (e.g. Cohen, 1960; Lombard, 2010).  In order to use 
Cohen’s kappa, the data must be independent, nominal and the judges operate independently.  
The first 50 chunks of the four interviews were submitted to a reliability analysis.  After 
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analyzing 300 chunks, 200 chunks and 120 chunks were also analyzed to determine if a stable 
agreement was met.  The Cohen’s kappa for 200 chunks was compared with the Cohen’s kappa 
for 120 chunks to gauge the reliability of the 300 chunk analysis.  To further assess validity, 25 
random chunks of the four interviews were submitted to a reliability analysis.  This assessment 
accounted for the possible confound of order of data chunks within the interview; for example 
more detail may have been relayed in the middle of the interview versus the descriptive 
beginning.  A kappa of 0.61 and a correlation of .80 (Landis and Koch, 1977) or higher was 
viewed as indicative of a reliable, or substantial, coding process.  Table 5 displays Landis and 
Koch’s values of indicative reliable coding.  Comparatively, Klein and Jarosz (2011) used 
Banerjee, Capozzoli, McSweeney and Sinha’s (1999) correlation values; less than 0.40 were 
considered poor agreement and kappa values between 0.40 and 0.75 were considered fair to good 
agreement (p. 430).  Reliability statistics were also calculated.  This statistic was calculated using 
the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).   
Table 5 
Landis and Koch’s Kappa Strength of Agreement 
Kappa Statistic Strength of Agreement 
< 0.00 Poor 
0.00 – 0.21 Slight 
0.21 – 0.40 Fair 
0.41 – 0.60 Moderate 
0.61 – 0.80 Substantial 
0.81 – 1.00 Almost Perfect 
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Results and Discussion  
Reliability  
The overall interrater agreement for the sensemaking codes (i.e., codes derived from the 
Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking) was 35.7% for the initial independent coding of 300 data 
chunks (the first seventy-five chunks of each interview transcript), 42.5% for the first 200 data 
chunks and 52.5% for the first 120 data chunks.  After the coders’ codes were reconciled, the 
interrater agreement was 84.3%, 89.5% and 85.8% respectively (See Table 6).  Cohen’s kappa 
coefficient was .288 for 300 data chunks, .357 for 200 data chunks and .461 for 120 chunks.  
According to Landis and Koch (1977), these fall into a range of values of 0.21 to 0.40 that 
represent a fair level of agreement.  After the coders’ codes were reconciled, the kappa 
coefficients increased to .823, .881 and .837.  The kappa coefficients are shown in Table 6. The 
coders then reviewed and discussed transcript chunks on which they disagreed in order to reach a 
98% reconciled agreement.   
A factor affecting to the kappa value and percent agreement prior to code reconciliation is 
the fact that the coders were refining the codes as they coded.  The codes, Background 
Information and Pre-Existing Knowledge, for example, initially were used inconsistently and 
almost interchangeably by the coders.  Background information refers to information that helps 
set the stage for the event to be described but was not used during the described event.  Pre-
existing knowledge is information that used during the event being conveyed.  The coders 
initially experienced difficulty differentiating the two codes due to ambiguity in their initial 
definitions.  This was resolved during the coding process by discussing and comparing the 
individuals’ use of each of the codes.   
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The overall interrater agreement for use of the COCOM codes was 84.7% for the initial 
independent coding of 300 data chunks; 85.5% for 200 data chunks and 89.2% for 120 data 
chunks.  After codes were reconciled, the interrater agreement was 98%, 97.5% and 97.5% (See 
Table 7).  Cohen’s kappa coefficient was .373 for 300 data chunks, .377 for 200 data chunks and 
.396 for 120 chunks; again representing a fair level of agreement.  When reconciled, the kappa 
coefficient increased to .916, .891 and .848 (See Table 7).  
A factor contributing to the high agreement post - reconciliation was likely the clear 
definitions of codes and clear distinctions between them.  The definitions were proposed by 
Hollnagel (2002) and were not altered by the coders.  The initial purpose of including the 
COCOM model was to assess the workload and the amount of information experts can handle; 
however, this will instead be pursued in a future analysis effort.  For the evaluation of aviation 
sensemaking, the use of the COCOM codes shed light on when action in the events described 
tended to be tactical and attentionally demanding rather than strategic, opportunistic, or 
scrambled.  The other control mode found in the data was the strategic control mode, where the 
individual uses more than just what is in front of him or her on the displays, i.e., more than just 
filling slots with incoming information; rather, the individual relies on their experiences to 
anticipate what behaviors are needed in the current situation. 
The codes describing the nature of time pressure on the pilots’ behavior, i.e., whether 
their performance is task-driven or self-paced, were also not included in the present analysis.  As 
with the COCOM codes, these codes will be considered in a future analysis that focuses on 
pilots’ workload.  
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Table 6 
Cohen’s Kappa Correlation for Initial and Reconciled Sensemaking and COCOM Codes 
 Sensemaking Codes 
 
 
COCOM Codes 
100 120 200 300 120 200 300 
Initial .288 .461 .357 .288 .396 .377 .373 
Reconciled .930 .837 .881 .823 .848 .891 .916 
 
Table 7 
Percent Agreement for Initial and Reconciled Sensemaking and COCOM Codes 
 Sensemaking Codes 
 
 
COCOM Codes 
100 120 200 300 120 200 300 
Initial 36.0% 52.5% 42.5% 35.7% 89.2% 85.5% 84.7% 
Reconciled 84.1% 85.8% 89.5% 84.3% 97.5% 97.5% 98.0% 
 
After evaluating the above Cohen’s kappa and percent agreement of 300, 200 and 120 
data chunks, it was decided that the data chunks chosen may not accurately capture the variety of 
the data set.  To assess whether a randomly chosen set of data chunks would produce other 
results, twenty-five data chunks from each interview were randomly chosen.  The overall 
interrater agreement for the sensemaking codes was 36% for the initial independent coding of 
100 data chunks randomly chosen; the same as for 300 chunks.  Cohen’s kappa coefficient was 
.288 for 100 data chunks, the same as for 300 chunks and a fair level of agreement.  The Cohen’s 
kappa was .930 once reconciled, which is similar to the original reconciled kappas. 
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Events Collected 
The events recounted in the critical event interviews are presented in Table 8.  Pilot A 
described difficulties associated with trying to maintain a tight orbit under high winds while 
flying a mid-sized UAS.  He also described a second event characterized by the difficulties 
associated with landing when an engine failure has occurred.  One of Pilot B’s events involved 
responding to ground fire.  He also described a second event in which he ran into difficulty 
during a routine requalification flight.  Pilot C discussed an engine failure event and the 
difficulties associated with differences between crew and mission control procedures in 
responding to the engine failure.  During the event, Pilot C dealt with engine, fuel and weather 
issues.  Finally, Pilot D’s event involved training a novice UAS pilot.  During the training flight, 
they struggled to keep separation from high terrain, shifting winds and low runway visibility.   
Table 8 
Events Extracted from Interviews 
Pilot Event 
A Orbiting a UAS in high winds 
A UAS Engine failure 
B Flying helicopter while receiving enemy fire from the ground 
B Completing a helicopter requalification flight; accidentally used the wrong 
approach plate.  An approach plate is a graphic document tool used by pilots 
to aid them during instrument approaches 
C Engine failure followed by unexpected micromanagement by squadron 
personnel on the ground during inclement weather 
D Instructing novice during live flight of UAS with impaired access to flight 
controls 
 
To give the reader a better idea of what the events involved, sequences of key pilot 
activities described in each are displayed in Table 9. 
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Table 9 
Sequences of Key Event Activities   
Partici-
pant/Event 
Initial 
Frame(
s) 
1st 
Phase 
2nd 
Phase 
3rd 
Phase 
4th 
Phase 
5th 
Phase  
6th 
Phase 
7th 
Phase 
Pilot A – 
Orbiting in 
high winds 
Fly 
orbits 
within 
tight 
bounda-
ry 
Orbit in 
high 
winds 
      
Pilot A – 
landing with 
and engine 
failure 
Experi-
ence an 
engine 
failure 
Com-
plete 
emer-
gency 
proce-
dures 
Establish 
glide 
Estab-
lish 
basic 
traffic 
pattern 
base to 
final leg 
Located 
destina-
tion 
point on 
airfield 
Con-
duct an 
180° 
turn 
Moni-
tor 
alti-
tude 
and 
dis-
tance 
to 
air-
field 
Check 
and 
ac-
count 
for 
winds 
Pilot B – 
Flying in 
hostile 
territory 
Stand-
ard 
Night 
Flight 
Proce-
dure 
Detect 
and 
respond 
to 
enemy 
fire 
Detect 
and 
respond 
to falling 
altitude 
     
Pilot B – Re-
qualification 
flight 
Deter-
mine 
flight 
goals  
Fly to 
destina-
tion 
Experi-
ence 
series of 
incon-
gruence 
Conduct 
ap-
proach 
for 
landing 
Recog-
nize and 
Re-
spond 
to 
ap-
proach 
error 
Pull up 
back to 
VHF 
Omni 
Range 
(VOR) 
to join 
Instru-
stru-
ment 
Flight 
Rules 
(IFR) 
  
Pilot C – 
Engine failure 
during routine 
event 
Begin 
routine 
flight 
Experi-
ence an 
engine 
failure 
Com-
mand 
person-
nel 
Follow 
direc-
tions of 
com-
Dump 
fuel 
Notice 
lower-
ing 
cloud 
De-
cide 
they 
can-
Con-
duct 
land-
ing 
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intervene 
in pilots’ 
response 
to engine 
failure 
mand 
person-
nel  
deck not 
divert 
with 
an 
inop-
era-
tive 
en-
gine  
Pilot D - 
Training 
Train 
novice 
to fly 
UAS  
Ap-
proach 
inclem-
ent 
weather 
Tempo-
rarily 
lost link 
Train 
tech-
niques 
to 
handle 
lost link 
event 
Miss 
the 
landing 
ap-
proach 
and 
conduct 
go-
around 
   
 
Patterns Within the Data 
After coding the data using the sensemaking theory codes, the coded data were reviewed 
to find patterns in the pilots’ sensemaking across the six events.  Patterns identified during the 
review were analyzed to see if they were reliably supported by the data.  Before walking through 
the chosen event to relay details, each participant described the event’s setting and goals.  This 
description served to define the frame.  The following patterns were reliably supported by the 
data: 
- Pattern 1: Experts relied predominantly on knowledge already in their event frame 
(coded as pre-existing knowledge), versus incoming data (coded as fill slot of frame), to 
make sense of their situation. 
- Pattern 2: There was a tendency for the seeking of data (coded as seek data) to co-occur 
with the drawing of inferences (coded as extend the frame).  
- Pattern 3: Three of the four experts seemed to perform sensemaking activities associated 
with reframing in a sequential manner.  This is demonstrated by the pattern in behavior 
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sequences of first recognizing a cue violating their active frame, then evaluating the cue 
before diagnosing the situation and then finally, reframing. 
These three patterns will be described in turn below. 
Pattern 1.  The first finding to be discussed is the tendency for experts to rely on pre-
existing knowledge already embedded in their frame, versus new incoming information, to make 
sense of the situation.  Out of a total of 718 data chunks, 21.03% (151 instances) were coded as 
use of pre-existing knowledge; the highest frequency out of all the codes.  This high frequency 
supports the notion that the experts relied on pre-existing knowledge more than any information 
in their environment.  However, to the extent that the use of pre-existing knowledge did not fully 
support sensemaking, the experts filled slots of their frames with information they obtained 
during the event.  The second highest frequency of all the codes was fill slots with a frequency of 
11.56% (83 instances).   
An example of these codes can be seen in Pilot D’s training event.  Pilot D used pre-
existing knowledge of the difficulties involved in UAS training, noting, for example that 
“another challenge of this system of pilot in-the-loop is that there are no conventional controls as 
with manned aircraft where you’re able to stay on the controls.”  This knowledge allows Pilot D 
to anticipate difficulties that may arise while training a novice and maintaining safety of flight.  
Pilot D had to further make sense of the event by filling slots with observable event information 
to address the severity of the flight.  An example of Pilot D filling slots occurs when the weather 
is observed, for example.  He discussed this as, “proceeding out to the GCS, noting the weather 
was, on our weather brief, was fairly gusty cross winds as they are out in the ranges.” 
 Pattern 1 implications for theory. The heavy use of pre-existing knowledge supports 
the idea that sensemaking is driven by a framework encapsulating past experiences (i.e., by 
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frames).  That is, this research suggests that experts in complex, time-pressured aviation domains 
rely more on their knowledge structures, frames or schemas, than on the incoming data to 
support sensemaking.  This is supported by the frequency with which the codes are used, both 
overall and during individual events.   
Pattern 2.  The second pattern assessed the tendency for pilots to seek additional data to 
help with drawing inferences and conclusions that extend the frame.  The pilots were more likely 
to “fill slots” of their frames with incoming data than they were to actively seek data (11.56% 
versus 2.92% of the data chunks, respectively).  It is suggested that pilots mainly actively sought 
data when the frame they were using was not completely adequate for guiding performance and 
behaviors in a given situation.  To evaluate this possibility, the frequency with which chunks 
coded as “seek data” were followed by chunks coded as “extend frame” was assessed.  Pilots 
engaged in seeking data 2.92% of the time with twenty-one instances in 718 data chunks.  Their 
data were coded as extending the frame 4.32% of the time with thirty-one instances.  In order to 
assess if these activities co-occurred, the events were analyzed to determine how many data 
chunks separated the activities of seeking data before extending the frame.  Column 4 of Table 
10 shows the frequency with which seeking data occurred shortly before extending the frame and 
the number of chunks to separate them in each event. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!
44 
Table 10 
Support for the Relationship Between Seeking Data and Extending the Frame 
Participant/Event Seek Data Extend the Frame Seek before 
Extend? 
Pilot A – Orbiting in 
high winds 
None:  
- Pilot did not 
engage in 
seeking data 
 
Six instances to: 
- Determine correct 
orbit pattern/path 
- Adjust for 
crabbing to 
maintain heading 
- Maneuver to give 
best view of target 
No instances of 
“seek data” 
Pilot A – Landing 
with an engine 
failure  
Nine instances to: 
- Monitor airspeed, 
rate of descent, 
winds and 
relation to airfield 
Five instances to:  
- Expedite descent 
to establish traffic 
pattern base to 
final leg. 
- Calculate glide 
ratio 
Three instances of 
the fourteen 
involving seeking 
and/or extending 
were:  
- One to four 
data chunks 
apart 
 
Pilot B – flying 
under enemy fire; 
losing altitude  
One instance to: 
- Position gunner 
on target 
 
None: 
- Pilot did not 
extend the frame 
 
No 
Pilot B – keep 
gunners on target 
Two instances to: 
- Position gunner 
on target 
- Determine 
meaning of 
light 
 
One instance to: 
- Calculate ability 
to shoot back 
 
Two instances of the 
three involving 
seeking and/or 
extending were: 
- Six to nine 
data chunks 
apart 
 
Pilot B – 
Completing 
qualification course  
None: 
- Pilot did not 
seek data 
 
None: 
- Pilot did not 
extend the frame 
 
No 
Pilot C – Engine 
failure response 
disagreement 
Seven instances to: 
- Assess health of 
aircraft 
- Determine 
weather  
- Assess where to 
Eight instances to: 
- Determine pilot 
cannot divert 
- Assess how long 
they can go-
around 
Six instances of the 
fifteen involving 
seeking and/or 
extending were: 
- One to two 
data chunks 
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!
Seeking data did tend to precede extending the frame.  There were twenty-one instances 
of seeking data and thirty instances of extending the frame.  Four events together included 
twenty cases of seeking data before extending the frame.  The two events that did not include this 
pattern included Pilot A orbiting in high winds, (extended the frame without first seeking data) 
and Pilot B flying under enemy fire; (sought data but did not extend the frame).!
Pattern 2 implications for theory.  Pattern 2 is consistent with the sensemaking model.  It 
does, however, suggest that the activities and dynamics described in the model could be further 
refined to better match real-world sensemaking.  In particular, support for pattern 2 suggests a 
tendency for people to rely on available information rather than to seek information and that 
land 
- Determine 
location of 
aircraft in 
relation to 
runway  
- Determine if 
they are lined up 
apart 
 
Pilot D - Training Two instances to: 
- Anticipate and 
determine if 
novice is 
making mis-
takes (e.g., if 
speed or 
altitude is off) 
 
Ten instances to: 
- Determine the 
difficulty of 
flight/event 
- Assess the need 
for intervening 
(i.e., corrections)  
- Compare what 
the student is 
doing to what 
Pilot D would do 
- Reprogram the 
aircraft to new 
configurations 
- Determine how 
much verbal 
instruction is 
needed 
- Knowledge to 
assess data link 
 
 Two instances of the 
twelve involving 
seeking and/or 
extending were: 
- Four to five 
data chunks 
apart  
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when they do seek information, it may tend to be for purpose of finding a frame that is not 
completely adequate for the situation at hand. The model does not suggest a specific pattern, 
however, with the current research, the individuals were seeking data before extending their 
frame, thus suggesting a sequential pattern between the two activities not stressed, but present, 
within the model.!
Pattern 3.  The third pattern is the tendency for pilots to reframe in response to a cue that 
they know, based on past experience or training, can signify a need to “reframe.”  Conversely, 
within this pattern, if a cue or the changed situation it represents is not part of the pilots’ training 
or experience set, the pilot will tend to “preserve the frame.”  Table 11 breaks down each case of 
a cue in violation with the current frame.  Once a pilot detects a cue in violation, she may 
“reframe,” or replace the existing frame with one suited to the situation.  If a pilot does not 
reframe, he would preserve the frame.  Table 11 breaks down each case of a cue violation across 
the six events.  Specifically, it indicates: the event, whether or not the individual reframed or 
preserved the frame and what detected cues were in conflict with the original frame.  The table 
also provides information on the pilot’s evaluation of the cue and whether or not the cue in 
violation could be anticipated or is something the pilot was prepared for.  Reframing was done 
1.25% of the time, i.e., found in nine out of 718 data chunks.  “Preserving the Frame” was used 
to code 3.06% or twenty-two instances out of 718 data chunks.   
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Table 11 
Responses to Cues that Conflict with Active Frame 
Participant/Event Reframe or 
Preserve the 
Frame 
Cue(s) in 
Violation 
Timeline 
of 
reframing: 
immediate 
vs. 
delayed 
response 
to cue 
Evaluation 
of Cue 
Pilot has 
warning or 
preparation 
Pilot A – Landing 
in high winds and 
an engine failure  
Reframe: 
Nominal flight 
conditions 
change to 
emergency 
flight 
conditions. 
Cue not 
stated 
outright. 
 
Immediate Transition to 
emergency 
precedes 
start of event 
description. 
Yes; pilots 
are taught to 
follow 
checklist 
procedures 
when 
landing with 
an engine 
failure.  
Pilot B – flying 
under enemy fire; 
losing altitude  
Reframe: 
Nominal night 
flight 
conditions 
change to high 
stress, under 
fire conditions.  
1st cue; white 
light, sinking 
too fast  
2nd cue; city 
buildings 
 
Delayed 
 
Pilot 
questioned 
incoming 
data 
Pilot 
recognized a 
violated 
expectancy 
and then 
evaluated to 
diagnose the 
cue in 
violation 
Yes; pilots 
flying in 
hostile 
territory 
anticipate 
possibilities 
of receiving 
fire from 
enemy 
Pilot B – 
Completing 
qualification 
course  
Preserve the 
frame: Easy 
requalification 
flight 
complicated by 
approach to 
wrong airport. 
1st cue; VHF 
Omni Flight 
Range 
(VOR) 
unexpected 
frequency  
2nd cue; 
Airport not 
in sight 
 
Delayed 
 
Pilot 
explained 
away data 
Pilot 
recognized 
the violating 
cue but 
explained it 
away 
No; pilots 
do not 
anticipate 
attempting 
wrong 
approaches 
when 
landing 
Pilot C – Engine 
failure  
Reframe: 
Nominal 
training flight 
conditions 
change to 
emergency 
1st cue; 
Thump 
2nd cue; 
Alarm light 
configuration 
 
Immediate 
 
Pilot knew 
to return to 
base when 
engine 
Pilot 
recognized a 
violated 
expectancy 
and then 
evaluated to 
Yes; pilots 
are trained 
to handle 
engine 
failures with 
standard 
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flight 
conditions. 
failure 
occurred 
diagnose the 
cue in 
violation. 
operation 
procedures 
(SOPs) 
Pilot C – 
Redirected by 
exercise 
leadership 
Preserve the 
frame: Trained 
response to 
engine failure 
is disrupted and 
new response is 
forced on crew. 
1st cue: pilot 
receives 
radio call to 
go around 
and dump 
fuel 
Delayed Pilot did not 
want to 
follow 
request.  
Preserved 
frame as 
long as he 
could. 
No; pilots 
do not 
expect to be 
interrupted 
while 
completing 
normal 
emergency 
procedure. 
Pilot C – 
Inclement 
weather; low fuel 
Reframe: 
Nominal 
weather 
conditions 
replaced by 
dropping cloud 
ceiling. 
1st cue; 
Ground 
controller 
calls in 
weather 
 
Immediate 
 
Pilot 
recognized 
weather as 
an issue 
Pilot did 
recognize 
violated 
expectancies, 
could not 
divert but 
fluently 
followed 
directions to 
land. 
Yes; pilots 
taught to 
handle 
inclement 
weather.  
 
 
Pilot D – teaching 
student; missed 
approach; cannot 
see runway to land  
Preserve the 
frame: Landing 
becomes a 
missed 
approach and 
go-around.  
1st cue; 
unable to see 
runway  
Immediate  Pilot 
recognized 
they couldn’t 
see the 
runway, 
however 
diagnosis 
was to use 
instruments 
and go-
around. 
Yes; 
instructors 
anticipate 
actions of 
novice 
pilots and 
are taught to 
land relying 
on 
instruments. 
 
Pattern 3 implications for theory. The data suggests a sequential flow of sensemaking 
activities that lead to reframing.  This suggests that the pilots performed sensemaking activities 
in a more organized, sequential manner than proposed by Klein’s sensemaking theory, which 
says reframing follows a less predictable set of activities.  As seen in Column 4, only two out of 
the seven events did not involve first recognizing a violated expectancy before reframing.  This 
supports the pattern of an organized flow because more often than not, the pilots first recognized 
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a violated expectancy, evaluated and diagnosed this expectancy and then reframed.  However, 
the number of cues that triggered reframing ranged from one to three cues, which is consistent 
with Klein’s sensemaking theory. 
Evaluating the Sensemaking Model Activities  
When interview chunks could not be coded using the existing set of codes, additional 
sensemaking activity codes were added.  These codes represented sensemaking activities that 
were not initially derived from the data/frame theory.  Those codes included: 
- Evaluating the cue in violation 
- Diagnosing the cue in violation 
- Elaboration 
- External questioning causing preserving of the frame 
- Assessing workload 
The sensemaking model does not specifically include the exact terms above, however the 
data suggests the current sensemaking model captures all of the sensemaking activities.  The 
authors used the above codes to analyze the data, but due to their similar nature to sensemaking 
activities described by Klein’s model, no new sensemaking activities are suggested for the 
model.  Therefore, this research supports the sensemaking model as a comprehensive 
conceptualization of sensemaking. 
Evidence of adding slots to frames or combining fragments of frames, activities described by 
the sensemaking model, were not seen.  It is possible, however, that the pilots may have been 
adding slots and combining fragments of frames because the activities can be difficult to detect. 
General Findings 
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In two events the pilot was unable to anticipate change that called for reframing; that is, the 
pilots were slow to recognize and adapt to their situation.  Pilot B and Pilot C, as indicated in the 
right-most column of Table 11, indicate this outcome.  The pilots in these two events interpreted 
and then ignored cues in order to preserve the active frame.  Pilot B was not expecting to be 
heading for a landing using the wrong airfield’s approach plates because this rarely occurs in 
aviation and pilots are not warned or trained to avoid it.  Pilot B preserved this frame even when 
faced with conflicting cues.  As an example, he describes his detection of an unexpected VOR: 
“and I look at my approach plate and the VOR is a different frequency.  And that should have 
been a dead give-away.”  He recognized a violated expectancy; however, he explained it away: 
“I justified it…they changed the frequency.  The plate is wrong.”  According to Pilot B, he was 
also hesitant to dispel this belief because he was very experienced, the flight was routine, and he 
was flying with a senior instructor. 
Pilot C’s emergency response training was incongruent with the procedures of the 
organization overseeing the exercise in which he was participating.  This may have caused Pilot 
C to preserve his own frame and follow the procedures he had been trained to use.  Both pilots 
also related that these events taught them invaluable lessons and techniques that they carried with 
them through their career.   
Contributions to Expertise Literature 
 The final goal of this research was to compare the sensemaking of military aviation 
experts to Chi’s (2006) compilation of general positive and negative expertise characteristics.  
An important fact to note is that Chi’s compilation is of expert characteristics found in research 
conducted primarily in controlled laboratory settings.  The current research examines experts in 
their natural domains. 
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Positive characteristics.  According to Chi, experts are able to arrive at effective solu-
tions.  The current research suggests that experts may only able to reach effective solutions when 
the situation is consistent with their experience base.  In particular, experts may not even 
recognize the need to reach a solution if an anomaly they have no reason to expect arises.  For 
example, Pilot B was slow to accept and diagnose his problem when he was trying to land using 
the wrong approach plate even though there were cues telling him something was wrong.  In 
comparison, Pilot D knew problems might arise when instructing a novice to fly routine 
maneuvers in difficult environmental factors.  This knowledge allowed Pilot D to effectively 
search and anticipate problems so that an effective solution could be reached. 
 A second positive characteristic of experts Chi identifies is their ability to detect features 
such as distinguishing patterns or unique cues.  This characteristic is found in Pilot C’s 
immediate use of certain information displays to confirm the engine failure diagnosis, Pilot B’s 
immediate detection of the vertically moving white light, and Pilot D’s ability to anticipate 
possibilities of the student’s behavior as he was monitoring through the event.   
 The third positive characteristic Chi calls out is that experts spend more time analyzing a 
problem before executing a behavior.  This characteristic represents a difference between the 
studies underlying Chi’s compilation and the present naturalistic research.  Experts may spend 
more time analyzing a problem when the stresses of the laboratory are limited.  In the current 
research, the environments were complex, safety critical and time limited.  The experts in this 
research may have spent more time analyzing a problem if they were allotted such time; 
however, the severity and danger involved in the events caused them to rely on schemas and past 
knowledge to determine and execute behaviors rapidly versus to spend time analyzing the 
“problem space”. 
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 According to Chi, experts self-monitor more than novices and because they tend to be 
more aware of their own limitations, experts are better at monitoring how well their abilities 
match a given situation.  This was observed in the present research when Pilot A monitored and 
adjusted his behavior accordingly due to the high winds.  Pilot B and Pilot C both had a more 
difficult time with self-monitoring, as they believed their behavior was correct.  It took more 
time for them to self-reflect than the others.  This may have been due to the details of their 
events.  Finally, Pilot D self-monitored his behavior by adjusting and reacting to the student’s 
behavior in order to teach and keep safety of flight during the event.   
Again, the difference in research settings contributes an addition to expert characteristics: 
experts in this study tended to reflect on situations and their performance after an event had 
occurred.  For example, Pilot B explains more about making the choice to pull out of the 
situation, “after I pull out, but if I hadn’t pulled out, I don’t think I would have hit anything but I 
would have been uncomfortably close.  I’m sure of that.”  In all, the pilots described post-event 
reflection in all of the six events.   
 Another characteristic of experts is the ability to implement adaptive strategies when 
needed.  The current research supports this characteristic, as seen in Pilot D’s strategy of 
continuously anticipating possible novice behavior pilot mistakes over the course of a training 
flight.    
In addition, experts are opportunistic in using available resources to handle their situa-
tions.  The current research also supports this characteristic, as seen in Pilot A’s instruction to the 
sensor operator seated next to him to call out the critical information needed for landing as Pilot 
A flew his approach.  Pilot B also used any resources he had such as the city lights.  He was 
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unable to look at his instruments due to the severity of the situation, however the lights provided 
the confirmation that he was loosing altitude.  .  
Negative characteristics.  Although it may seem counterintuitive to examine the negative 
characteristics of experts, doing so is just as important as examining the positive characteristics 
because expert weaknesses can reveal the types of aids that can increase experts’ abilities.   
 One of the four negative characteristics described by Chi is the domain specificity of 
expertise.  The current research did not examine this characteristic.  There was no evidence 
obtained to evaluate carry-over of their expertise to other domains. 
 Experts’ overconfidence in their abilities can cause biased reasoning, leading to negative 
results.  The current research provides an example of this characteristic as seen in Pilot B’s 
overconfidence in the accuracy of his approach information and approach performance in the 
Requalification Flight event.  There were many indications that he was not correct; however, the 
pilot was confident in his landing abilities and initially refused to consider the possibility that he 
had made a mistake.  
 The negative characteristic of experts under-estimating novice performance was not seen 
in the current research, with one possible exception.  Pilot D’s continuous anticipation of 
possible trainee errors might be considered a form of underestimating the trainees.  In this case, 
however, underestimating seems an adaptive, positive characteristic.  
 Finally, inflexibility of experts to changes in rules may not have been seen in the current 
research.  One of the pilots, Pilot C, experienced a change in rule set for responding to inflight 
emergencies.  Whether his resistance to this change is negative or positive is debatable.  There 
were good reasons behind the rule set he knew and he was fully aware of those good reasons; on 
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the other hand, his resistance to the new rule set negatively impacted his situation awareness and 
thus his performance. 
Conclusions 
In summary, this cognitive task analysis of expert military aviators in complex environ-
ments indicated support for Klein’s Data/Frame Model of Sensemaking and provided additional 
insight into the nature of some of the activities in the model.  For example, the dominance of pre-
existing knowledge used by the experts indicated their extreme reliance on preformed mental 
models possibly due to the pressure of the environment.  The infrequency with which data are 
actively sought further supports the tendency for experts to rely on their preexisting knowledge 
in complex, dense environments.  Finally, the resistance to reframing when the cues or situation 
calling for it are not part of the pilots’ mental model or experience base, concludes a more 
organized pattern to sensemaking than Klein states.  These findings could aid training and 
interface design as decision-making is more thoroughly understood.  
Results were also consistent with most of Chi’s conclusions about characteristics of 
experts.  Exceptions were these experts relied more on their experience base to arrive at 
solutions, they were not able to analyze their situations due to time limitations, and provided 
with more time to plan. 
This research has the potential to contribute to our understanding of workload capacity, 
information load capacity, and the process of sensemaking.  Greater knowledge in these areas 
will provide a foundation not just for additional research but also for improved training and 
sociotechnical system designs.  
These findings could also aid the design of how and what information is provided to the 
pilot, for example what information is critical and what information is not.  Understanding the 
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activities and processes involved in decision-making could enhance training regimes and how 
standard operations should be performed. 
In must be noted that a negative aspect in using naturalistic observation is the time it can 
take to collect data.  In the current research, the data was collected over a year.  The participants 
were highly involved within their military domain thus scheduling interviews was difficult.  
Coding the data was also highly time consuming.  In order for both coders to be consistent and in 
agreement with the coding method, a high percentage of the interviews were discussed and 
reviewed together.  This process served as a training phase for both of the coders.  Finally, 
during this process the definitions of the codes adapted fairly often.  Finalized definitions are 
presented in the research and future research could benefit from using the definitions in order to 
save time. 
Future research could further enhance this current research by using quantitative 
measures.  An example could be to evaluate sensemaking activities during simulated, controlled 
aviation events.  More so, examining behavior during an event where reframing is crucial to 
safety of flight such as during a catastrophic event.  Also, “reaction” questionnaires could be 
given to pilots after performing an intensive-rich scenario to receive feedback.  Once more is 
known about the handling of information, display placement and designs could be enhanced for 
improved implementation for pilots and thus increase readiness for their respective tasks. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Participant Background Questionnaire  
 UAS Crew Pre-Demonstration Background Questionnaire 
Date: _____________   Participant #______ 
All personal information will be kept completely confidential and will not be included in any of 
the reports or documents being produced as a result of this study.  
1. What is your age?     ____ years 
 
2. Please indicate your role during this week’s flight demonstration: 
____ Pilot     ____ Sensor Operator       ____ Mission Commander     ____ Other: ________________ 
 
3. What military branch(es) are you and have you been affiliated with (reserves or active duty)?  
___ Army     ___ Air Force    ___ Marines    ___ Navy    ___ Coast Guard   
 
4.  When did you complete qualification training for CBP UAS operations?     ___ yrs  ___ mths ago 
 
5. For how long have you been in your current assignment?   _____ yrs  _____ mths 
 
6.  Rate your level of experience communicating directly with ATC in the NAS as a UAS crewmember.  
No experience    1   2   3   4   5   6   7    Very experienced 
 
7. Are you a rated pilot?        ! Yes       ! No 
 
8.    If applicable, list types of manned aircraft, hours, and highest ratings held for each: 
      AIRCRAFT           TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS                   HIGHEST RATING 
__________________________         ________________________            _______________________ 
__________________________         ________________________            _______________________ 
__________________________         ________________________            _______________________ 
__________________________         ________________________            _______________________ 
__________________________         ________________________            _______________________ 
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__________________________         ________________________            _______________________ 
 
9. If applicable, list past experience in airspace command and control (C2) (e.g. AWACS, JSTARS, E2C)?   
   POSITION/MOS                          TOTAL HOURS                 ASSIGNMENT DATES (yr -yr) 
__________________________         ________________________            _______________________ 
__________________________         ________________________            _______________________ 
__________________________         ________________________            _______________________ 
__________________________         ________________________            _______________________ 
__________________________         ________________________            _______________________ 
 
10. What UAS are you currently, have you been, and are you currently certified to operate?  
           UAS TYPE        POSITION                          HIGHEST RATING       CUM. HRS or MTHS 
____________________         ____________________   _______________________         ____________ 
____________________         ____________________   _______________________         ____________ 
____________________         ____________________   _______________________         ____________ 
____________________         ____________________   _______________________         ____________ 
11.  Estimate your total and recent flight hours accumulated as a UAS Pilot (or AVO; any platform).    
  
- In protected US airspace:  _____ total hrs  _____ hrs in past 6 mths 
 
- In Theater of Operations:  _____ total hrs   _____ hrs in past 6 mths 
 
12. Estimate your total and recent flight hours accumulated as a UAS Sensor Operator (or MPO).      
 
- In protected US airspace:  _____ total hrs   _____ hrs in past 6 mths 
 
- In Theater of Operations:  _____ total hrs   _____ hrs in past 6 mths 
 
13. Estimate your total and recent time accumulated as a UAS Mission Commander (MC).           
!!!!
61 
 
- In protected US airspace:  _____ total mths    _____ mths in past 6 mths 
 
- In Theater of Operations:  _____ total mths    _____ mths in past 6 mths 
 
14.   For about how much time have you served as an ‘external’ pilot, managing take-offs/launches and 
landings/recoveries? 
   ____ mths   ____ yrs   
 
15. Has any other past experience contributed to your expertise in Customs and Border Patrol UAS 
operations? If so, please list it below: 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ ! !!!!!!!!!!!
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
“How much information can the pilots handle?  How much information is too much 
information?”   
Prior to the Interview: " Ensure participants have read and signed the Informed Consent Document. " Make sure audio recorder is working (test it). Make sure audiotape is labeled correct-
ly. Make sure extra AA batteries are nearby. 
 
The following interview is in support of a thesis for the completion of a masters of science 
degree from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.  The interview is designed to find out what 
information you as an Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV) pilot seek, use, ignore etc. while 
conducting operations.   
 
I’m going to ask you to walk us through two events you’ve experienced in the past and that are 
memorable as we’re going to ask you to try to recall as many details as possible. As you walk 
through each event, please try to be as specific as possible regarding the event and walk us 
through, while keeping in mind the goal of information load and management.   
 
All information collected will be protected and kept confidential.  Participant numbers will be 
assigned to your responses.  If you would like a copy of your interview transcript, please feel 
free to contact Katherine Kaste kastek@my.erau.edu or Dr. Kelly Neville nevillek@erau.edu.  
Thank you for your participation.  
 
The protocol for each of the two events: 
 
First, I’d like you to recall a situation or event that you’ve experienced and that stands out in 
your memory. This should be a challenging, difficult, or unusual event. It would also be good if 
it is an information-intensive event. I’m after a specific event on a specific day, for example, 
you land the aircraft at the end of every flight, but I’m after that particular landing on March 5th 
when something happened that made the landing especially challenging. (Researcher offers 
suggestion if she or he has one.) 
 
Interviewee chooses an event, relates the idea to the researcher… 
 
After the interviewee chooses an event and the researcher agrees that it is a good choice, 
give the following instructions: 
 
Please walk us through the event starting with what you were doing just before the event began. 
We’d like to hear how your awareness of the event developed, what you were doing, trying to 
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do, thinking deciding, noticing, communicating, and so forth. Please try to put yourself back into 
the [pilot’s] seat and walk us through the details of that event as best you can. 
 
After the interviewee walks through the event, the researcher tries to recount the details, 
from the beginning to the end of the event, and asks for clarification and elaboration along 
the way. In particular, the researcher should seek additional details related to the following 
prompts: 
- How and when the pilot recognized something unusual was happening—what were the cues 
and did the pilot notice and respond to them all. 
- What information did the pilot wish he or she had.  What information was he or she 
anticipating to receive? 
- Was any information potentially distracting and was the pilot able to ignore it? What made 
the information distractible and able to be ignored? 
- How did the sensor operator or others help the pilot along the way, or did they? 
- What else was the pilot doing or thinking about? 
- Had the pilot experienced anything similar previously and, if so, did that past experience 
influence his response to the current event? 
 
Interview Notes: 
 
We are interested in what information were you attending to. How was the information obtained?  
What information were you intentionally ignoring?  Was there information you were expecting 
to receive and possibly did not?  Rather than answer our questions directly, we would like you to 
walk us through a specific information-intensive situation or event you encountered while flying. 
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Appendix C:!Coding Definitions – (Adapted from Sieck et al., 2007).  
Frame –an organizational structure used to give meaning to data and make sense of the 
information at hand.  
Codes 
1. Define a frame. Reference goals, constraints, or structural characteristics known about the 
current situation, i.e., captured in the active frame. (Not specified by Seick et al. as part of the 
sensemaking process.) 
2. Seek or choose a frame 
2a. Use anchor(s) to elicit frame – Use cues or pieces of data to elicit a frame. (Cues and 
data used to elicit a frame are considered anchors).  
2b. Use experience and context to elicit frame. Use the context of current activities and 
conditions combined with knowledge of procedures and patterns to elicit a frame that 
anticipates the next situation or goal. (Not specified by Seick et al.) 
3. Use data constant in the frame – Use a goal or piece of data that is embedded in the chosen 
frame to support sensemaking. The data element so reliably co-occurs with the frame that it has 
become intertwined or pre-packaged with the frame. (Not specified by Seick et al.) 
4. Confirm and elaborate the frame  
4a. Seek data. Take effortful actions to obtain data (versus just use what is given via 
communications or display); assess understanding of situation to determine whether more 
data are needed. 
4b. Draw inferences and conclusions that extend the frame:  Observed data allow the 
individual to elaborate the frame once more is learned. 
4c. Fill data slots in frame.  In order to gain a more comprehensive picture of the situation. 
4d. Add data slots to frame. In order to gain a more comprehensive picture of the situation. 
4e. Combine fragments of frames. When situations have not been encountered previously 
or vary in fundamental ways each time they’re encountered, a single useful frame may 
not exist and a person may draw from multiple fragments of frames to support sensemak-
ing. 
4f. Use pre-existing knowledge to fill data slots: similar to data constant, involves attaching 
rules to the data within the frame. 
 
For 4a-4c, choose from the following (Not specified by Seick et al.): 
Characteristics of Control Modes: Derived from E. Hollnagel (2002). 
!!!!
65 
The Contextual Control Model (COCOM): “describes how the orderliness of performance 
depends on the level of control and which provides further details about the selection of actions 
and the evaluation of events.”  Describes human performance in terms of feedback and 
feedforward control cycles and makes explicit the relationship between action and situation 
understanding, time pressure, and clarity of feedback.    
- Strategic control: - The most efficient of the five control modes; Higher-level goals and 
predictions influence behavior, not just what is in front of the controller.  There is abundant 
time available and the situation can be either routine or novel.  The required attention level is 
medium to high and several goals drive behavior. Evaluation of the outcome is characterized 
as “elaborate” and involves multiple variables that are both directly and indirectly related.  
- Tactical (attended) control: Known procedures or rules are followed with care.  Adequate 
time is available and the person perceives the situation as almost routine or routine but 
important. The work is given a medium to high level of attention.  There is constrained set of 
several goals guiding behavior and evaluation of the outcome is based on the full set of 
relevant available features so that performance accuracy can be maintained. 
- Tactical (unattended) control:  The work is of the same type as described for tactical 
attended control but the person is not as conscientious about the accuracy of the con-
trol/performance. The time allotted is more than adequate, a low level of attention is given, 
and a constrained set of several goals guides behavior. Evaluation of outcomes is perfuncto-
ry. 
- Opportunistic control: Features of the current situation and moment drive behavior.  This 
control is used when the data within the environment are incomplete or there is inadequate 
time to make a decision. The person is familiar but not experienced with the situation and a 
high level of attention is required. One or two competing goals drive behavior and evaluation 
of performance outcomes tends to be concrete and limited to obvious changes. 
-  Scrambled control: - Least efficient; Behavior is random trial-and-error.  There is very 
limited time for choosing actions, the person is not familiar with the situation, and full 
attention is required as the performer tries to find meaning in feedback while experiencing 
significant time pressure.  There is usually one goal being considered and evaluation of 
outcomes is limited and based on only rudimentary, poorly understood details. 
For 4a-4c, also choose from the following (detail codes) (Not specified by Seick et al.): 
- Data and inference updates are self-paced: Checking data value or drawing infer-
ence/conclusion is self-paced. 
- Data and inference updates are task-driven: Checking data value or drawing infer-
ence/conclusion is task-driven. 
For 4a-4c, also choose the following if applicable (Not specified by Seick et al.): 
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- Use as anchor: Value, inference, or conclusion is used as an anchor to elicit, establish 
and confirm frame. 
5. Preserve the frame - explain away, minimize the importance of, ignore, or distort data that 
does not fit the current chosen frame.   
6. Question the frame - Question whether or not the incoming data fits the active frame.  
6a. Question the quality of the data Seek confirmation of data or the same information 
from a second or third source. 
6ai.  One additional sources Obtain confirmatory or back-up information from one 
source. 
6aii. Two additional sources. Obtain confirmatory or back-up information a second 
source. 
6b. Test the frame. Test frame by comparing the results of actions and interactions with 
frame-based predictions. 
6c. Recognize a violated expectancy - Notice that incoming information does not fit 
predictions derived from the frame, data slots, or expected slot values and, consequently, 
question the frame’s appropriateness. 
7. Compare the frame with alternative frames – Identify alternative frames, collect evidence 
to support the comparison of alternative frames with the active frame, or directly test the most 
likely frame (e.g., by taking actions and assessing whether the result is what’s predicted for a 
given frame). 
8. Reframe – Adapt the active frame or elicit or construct a new frame to support sensemaking 
in a given situation.  
8a. Adapt the active frame. Frame adaptations can involve establishing new anchors, 
recognizing previously discarded data as relevant, or revising goals. 
8b. Elicit or construct a new frame. Eliciting or constructing a new frame supports 
sensemaking recovery, a term Seick et al. use to describe the recognition of a situation for 
what it really is, versus, for example, what a perceiver expected or wanted it to be.   
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Appendix D: Example of Coded Data Chunks using the Sensemaking Model 
Frame: Maintain a tight orbit within a restricted airspace under high wind conditions that are 
causing ‘crabbing’ of the aircraft. 
Subjective Assessment of Workload:  “It was so challenging it was something that you had to 
constantly focus on. It wasn’t something that you could really take your attention away from for 
a period of time.” 
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Pilot A Author Human Factors Educator  Final code Agreement 
  
High-
Level 
Code 
Specific 
Code 
Detail 
Code 
Detail 
Code 
Focus 
of Data 
Chunk 
High-
Level 
Code 
Specific 
Code 
Detail 
Code 
Detail 
Code 
Focus of 
Data 
Chunk  
  
1 - Yes, 2 - 
No, 3 
Reconciled 
Picture it as a 
box, the 
airspace we 
were flying 
it’s a 
restricted 
airspace and 
we were in 
the southeast 
corner of that 
airspace, as 
far as we 
could get 
into the 
corner. 
Define a 
Frame 
Use 
experi-
ence and 
context 
to elicit 
frame 
    
Mission 
Descript
scrip-
tion 
Define 
frame 
(DF) 
 
 
 
Rows 1-
4 also: 
Seek or 
choose 
a frame 
(SCF 
Use 
experi-
ence or 
context 
to adapt 
or elicit 
frame 
-- -- 
Mission 
descrip-
tion 
DF 1 
…and we 
tried to 
maintain. If 
we were to 
fly out of 
that airspace 
we would 
have violated 
our 
Certificate of 
Authoriza-
tion (COA). 
Define a 
Frame 
Use 
experi-
ence or 
context 
to adapt 
or elicit 
frame 
    
Mission 
descrip-
tion 
DF  -- -- -- 
Mission 
descrip-
tion  
DF 1 
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So, trying to 
give the 
ground 
element the 
best 
overview and 
oversight of 
their target. 
Define a 
Frame        
Goal of 
mission DF       Goal DF 1 
We were in 
tight...in 
tight...orbitin
g turns in 
that corner. 
CEF FS     
Mission 
descrip-
tion 
CEF FS     
Mission 
descrip-
tion 
CEF/F
S 1 
The winds, if 
I can 
remember 
correctly 
were around 
30 to 40 
knots at 
altitude. 
CEF FS       
CEF 
 
Rows 5-
7 also:  
SCF 
FS 
 
Use 
anchors 
to adapt 
or elicit 
frame  
      CEF/FS 1 
So you 
would notice 
your ground 
speed 
change… 
Confirm 
and 
Elabo-
rate the 
Frame  
Fill Slot       CEF FS       CEF/FS 1 
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…and on 
your heads 
down display 
actual 
ground speed 
versus your 
air speed 
CEF 
Pre-
Existing 
Knowel
dge 
DC?     CEF 
Draw 
infer-
ences & 
conclu-
sions 
that 
extend 
frame 
(DIC) 
      
CEF/
Ex-
tend 
3 
You can tell 
that in your 
turns, or your 
downwind 
leg, that you 
were 
crabbing 
quite a bit to 
maintain that 
heading. 
Confirm 
and 
Elabo-
rate the 
Frame 
Draw 
infer-
ences & 
conclu-
sions 
that 
extend 
frame 
(DIC) 
Tactical 
(attend-
ed) 
TD   CEF Extend 
Tactical 
(attend-
ed) 
TD   
CEF/
Ex-
tend/T
ac 
(att)/T
D 
1 
…and then 
the sensor 
operator that 
was taking 
information 
or requests 
from the 
ground 
element,  
CEF FS 
      
CEF FS Strategic 
Task-
driven 
(TD) 
 
CEF/F
S/Stra
t/TD 
3 
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…you know 
to, uh, 
maintain 
eyes on the 
target at a 
specific 
location or 
grid 
coordinate so 
to give him 
the best view 
look or 
angles in my 
turns around 
those points,  
CEF 
Pre-
Existing 
Knowel
dge 
      CEF 
Pre-
Existing 
Knowle
dge 
DC Stra-tegic 
Task-
driven 
(TD) 
CEF/P
re/DC
/Strate
gic/T
D 
3 
…determine 
the type of 
race track 
pattern or 
orbit that we 
would make 
so those are 
the kinds of 
things we 
would 
discuss back 
and forth 
between 
myself… 
Confirm 
and 
Elabo-
rate the 
Frame 
Draw 
infer-
ences & 
conclu-
sions 
that 
extend 
frame 
(DIC) 
Tactical 
(unat-
tended) 
Task 
Driv-
en  
  
CEF 
Extend 
the 
Frame 
Strategic 
Task-
driven 
(TD) 
  
CEF/
Ex-
tend/S
trate-
gic/T
D 
3 
…and I 
could hear 
the ground 
person 
speaking as 
well,  
Confirm 
and 
Elabo-
rate the 
Frame 
Fill 
Slots 
Loose 
Control 
Task 
Driv-
en 
An-
chor: 
Instruc-
tions 
from 
SO to 
Pilot 
CEF FS LC TD 
SO’s 
instruc-
tions to 
pilot 
CEF/F
S 1 
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…but then at 
times the 
sensor 
operator 
would say, 
“let’s make 
left hand 
turns versus 
right hand 
turn I think 
that would be 
a better 
camera look 
from this 
angle… 
CEF FS       
Follow 
Direc-
tions 
        CEF/FS 2 
So we may 
have 
changed 
orbit as we 
were flying.  
We changed 
it back from 
one side to 
the other. 
Elabora-
tion         
Elabora-
tion?         
Elabo-
ration 1 
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[…you said 
you noticed 
you were 
crabbing 
based on 
your view of 
the ground 
speed 
compared to 
the airspeed 
on the head 
down 
display, or 
changes in 
their 
relation-
ship…and 
then there 
was some 
other piece 
of 
information 
you were 
using too I 
think? ] Well 
as you’re 
flying there’s 
a heads down 
display that 
will give you 
your 
instruments, 
basically all 
the…airspee
d, your 
pressures, 
your sensors 
in the 
aircraft. 
CEF FS       CEF FS 
Tactical 
(unat-
tended) 
SP   
CEF/F
S/Tac 
(un)/S
P 
3 
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Then your 
heads up 
display is 
actually 
roving map 
or your video 
display, and 
it has a little 
icon of an 
aircraft on 
there with a 
crumb trial. 
CEF FS       CEF FS       CEF/FS 1 
So as you’re 
flying you 
can, and 
trying to 
maintain 
staying 
inside that 
restricted 
airspace, you 
can see the 
aircraft 
merging 
closer to the 
boundary in 
those wind 
conditions, 
which 
depends on 
which way 
you are 
flying… 
Confirm 
and 
Elabo-
rate the 
Frame 
Fill Slot 
Tactical 
(attend-
ed) 
Self-
Paced 
An-
chor: 
Video 
display 
of 
aircraft 
reach-
ing 
bounda-
ry 
CEF FS 
Tactical 
(attend-
ed) 
TD 
  
CEF/F
S/Tac 
(att)/T
D 
3 
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So you’d 
have to make 
a correction 
further to the 
right or to 
the left to 
maintain that 
westerly or 
easterly 
heading.  
Confirm 
and 
Elabo-
rate the 
Frame 
Draw 
Infer-
ences 
and 
conclu-
sions 
that 
extend 
the 
frame 
Strategic 
Task 
Driv-
en 
An-
chor: 
Position 
on map 
relative 
to 
bounda-
ry of air 
space  
CEF 
Draw 
Infer-
ences 
and 
conclu-
sions 
that 
extend 
the 
frame 
Tactical 
(attend-
ed) 
TD 
  
CEF/
Ex-
tend/T
ac 
(att)/T
D 
1 
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[So, if you 
can see the 
aircraft 
coming 
closer to the 
border up on 
the heads 
up…on the 
map, how do 
you…how 
are you also 
using the 
speed 
indicators?] 
Um it would 
be…as far as 
making… in 
trying to 
make the 
turns equal, 
you know, in 
distance…so 
I might go 
the 
downwind 
leg, if I have 
a tailwind, it 
might be, for 
one minute it 
might take 
me two 
minutes to go 
back 
westerly 
direction the 
other way. 
Confirm 
and 
Elabo-
rate the 
Frame 
Seek 
Data 
Scram-
bled 
Task 
Driv-
en 
Anchor: 
Aircraft 
position 
during 
each leg 
CEF 
Draw 
Infer-
ences 
and 
conclu-
sions 
that 
extend 
the 
frame 
Tactical 
(attend-
ed) 
TD 
  
CEF/
Ex-
tend/T
ac 
(att)/T
D 
3 
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 I would 
maintain a 
constant spot 
on the 
ground, over 
the ground, 
without a lot 
of variation 
for the 
operator. 
CEF 
Pre-
Existing 
Knowel
dge 
      Back-ground       Goal 
Back-
groun
d 
3 
[Is that 
something 
you’re doing 
a lot of 
calculating in 
your head, to 
manage?] 
Yes, not 
calculator.  
You might 
try a minute 
and a half 
and if that 
doesn’t work 
then I’ll try 
two minutes 
and the next 
time, 
whatever 
gives you the 
same 
footprint 
over the 
ground. 
RI         
Redun-
dant 
infor-
mation 
(RI); 
Same 
point as 
two 
rows up. 
        RI 1 
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So you’re 
relying on 
that map 
display, to 
see your 
relation to 
where you’re 
at on the 
map.  So 
that’s the 
difference 
between 
manned, 
unmanned. 
Back-
ground       
Redun-
dant 
Infor-
mation  
Back-
ground         
Back-
groun
d 
1 
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In a manned 
aircraft you 
look outside 
you’re 
either…finger 
on the map 
saying, “this is 
where I’m at,” 
and you can 
see your drift.  
Well in an 
unmanned 
aircraft you’re 
really not 
using that look 
down…the 
cameras 
looking at the 
target and 
you’re forward 
looking 
camera only 
has a field of 
view off the 
nose of the 
aircraft, so you 
don’t have a 
relation to the 
ground from 
that, uh, that 
“day TV” 
camera that is 
within a 
certain 
degree…field 
of view off the 
nose… 
Back-
ground         
Back-
ground         
Back-
groun
d 
1 
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So you’re 
using the 
heads up 
map display 
and watching 
your icon 
track…  
RI         RI         RI 1 
…across the 
map and it 
gives you 
that drift 
relation, or 
that, uh, 
crabbing 
angle as 
well. 
CEF FS       RI         RI 3 
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[So, if you’re 
in a manned 
aircraft, um, 
and so…I’m 
so…it’s 
interesting to 
hear that, how 
much in the 
manned 
aircraft you 
are actually 
looking out 
[right, right] 
what happens 
then, would 
you just not be 
doing this type 
of a task if it 
was, um, bad 
really poor 
weather? 
Or…] No, 
well, weather 
minimums are 
no different 
from manned 
to unmanned 
or they might 
be more 
restrictive 
depending on 
the type of 
aircraft you’re 
flying, but that 
would make a 
difference.  If I 
understand 
your question 
correctly… 
Back-
ground         
Back-
ground         
Back-
groun
d 
1 
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[But this gets 
harder for you 
in the 
unmanned 
probably 
compared to 
the manned it 
gets relatively 
harder as the 
winds pick up 
and that sort 
of thing it 
sounds like, 
um, you said 
it was 30 to 
40 knots in 
this particular 
situation 
which made it 
really 
challenging.] 
It was so 
challenging, it 
was 
something 
that you had 
to constantly 
focus on. It 
wasn’t 
something 
that you could 
really take 
your attention 
away from for 
a period of 
time. 
Work-
load         
Work-
load         
Work-
load 1 
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…because 
the proximity 
we were to 
the boundary 
line, you 
know we 
were within, 
probably 50, 
or probably 
100 meters 
of being 
outside of 
our spot,  
Define 
Frame         DF         DF 1 
…which was 
probably 
closer then 
we should’ve 
been…it 
wasn’t that 
big of a deal 
just that it 
was 
something 
we had to 
pay real 
close 
attention 
to…because 
we didn’t 
want to 
violate our 
authorization 
that we had 
with the 
FAA at that 
time 
CEF 
Pre-
Existing 
Knowle
dge 
DC     CEF 
Pre-
Existing 
Knowle
dge 
DC     CEF/Pre/DC 1 
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[you were 
making a 
decision 
about um, 
there was a 
decision I 
guess 
whether to 
go right or 
left or the 
what the path 
or track 
should be, 
um, are you 
involved in 
that decision 
as the pilot? 
Or are you 
letting the 
others…] Oh 
yes…yes, 
it’s, uh, 
aviate first so 
if they want 
you to do 
something 
you gatta 
accommo-
date as you 
can…you 
know, you 
might take an 
extra turn, or 
say, “I’ll be 
with you in a 
minute,” 
Back-
ground         CEF 
Pre-
Existing 
Knowle
dge 
Meta-
Knowled
ge 
    
CEF/P
re/Met
a 
3 
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I have to, 
whatever I 
need to do to 
put the 
aircraft 
where I want 
it to be…per 
my flight 
plan or per 
what I am 
authorized to 
do…and then 
as I can 
accommo-
date 
them…they 
take second 
place if you 
know what I 
mean.    
Back-
ground         RI         RI 3 
!!!!
86 
[And, uh, can 
you remember 
from that 
particular 
incident, how 
you, what 
information you, 
or what 
feedback you 
were giving to 
the sensor 
operator, or as 
best you can 
maybe…and to 
the ground 
element] It was 
basically saying 
that, uh, 
depending on 
the turns that I 
was taking and 
how that was 
affecting…um is 
looked down 
with the camera 
because if the 
wing, your wing 
is over 
sometimes that 
would…if it’s a 
tight turn that 
would obstruct 
your view with 
the target 
momentarily if 
that was going 
to be an issue or 
not, and 
uh…um…so it 
was… 
Confirm 
and 
Elabo-
rate the 
Frame 
Fill Slot       CEF 
Pre-
Existing 
Knowle
dge 
DC   
observe 
wing 
angle 
and 
visibility 
of target 
CEF/P
re/DC 3 
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[So you let 
them…]It 
wasn’t that 
it…it was 
just whatever 
was given 
the best look 
angle so if I 
had a 
shallow turn 
it turns out 
then well I 
had to make 
sure there 
was enough 
distance so 
that I 
wouldn’t 
encroach on 
the boundary 
line…so I 
might have 
made a 
shallower 
turn at that 
one corner of 
the airspace 
versus the 
other side I 
would have 
made a 
standard 
return.  
CEF 
Draw 
infer-
ences 
and 
conclu-
sions 
that 
extend 
the 
frame 
Strategic  
Task 
Driv-
en 
An-
chor: 
angle of 
turn 
based 
on 
bounda-
ry 
CEF 
Draw 
infer-
ences 
and 
conclu-
sions 
that 
extend 
the 
frame 
Strategic TD 
deter-
mine 
appro-
priate 
wing 
angle 
based on 
distance 
from 
bounda-
ry 
CEF/
Ex-
tend/S
trate-
gic/T
D 
1 
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[And does the 
sensor 
operator and 
the ground 
element, are 
they...do they 
understand 
those 
decisions that 
you have to 
make or are 
you talking 
them through 
it as you do 
this?] No, no 
that’s 
understood 
because its 
not assumed, 
but it’s after 
working with 
them so long 
they 
understand 
that…they 
wait for the 
turn…or if 
the camera 
operator 
cannot 
maintain 
track for a 
few seconds, 
then they just 
wait until it’s 
back on. 
Back-
ground       
CRM 
descrip-
tion 
CEF 
Pre-
Existing 
Knowle
dge 
Meta-
Knowled
ge 
    
CEF/P
re/Met
a 
3 
